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ABSTRACT 
While there is growing interest in entrepreneurial earnings, prior studies have typically 
focused on the incomes derived from business ownership, a highly problematic measure, 
prone to under-reporting and mismeasurement, which fails to capture either the financial 
rewards of entrepreneurship or the economic well-being of entrepreneurs. Using the Wealth 
& Assets Survey (WAS), a large-scale British population survey, this study focuses on 
household wealth, the stock of economic resources in the form of accumulated personal 
assets. Results show that entrepreneurial households own disproportionately more wealth 
than other households, and that the household wealth of business owners with employees is 
greater than the household wealth of the self-employed with no employees. Attributing a 
causal relationship between entrepreneurship and household wealth is problematic; however, 
our estimates suggest entrepreneurship has a cumulative effect on household wealth. 
Households with levels of wealth at or above the median become wealthier as a consequence 
of entrepreneurship, but no such effect is observed on the wealth of households below the 
median level.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
x There is growing interest in entrepreneurial earnings; however prior studies have 
typically focused on incomes derived from business ownership - a highly problematic 
measure, which fails to fully capture the rewards of entrepreneurship. In contrast, 
wealth comprises a stock of accumulated assets providing a more robust measure of 
relative success and economic well-being over the life-course of the business and the 
individual entrepreneur.  
 
x Using the UK Wealth & Assets Survey (WAS), we assess the relative wealth of 
entrepreneurs. First, we examine the size, composition and distribution of 
entrepreneurial wealth, comparing the wealth of business owners with employees 
(employers) and self-employed individuals with no employees (self-employed), with 
remaining population groups, measuring wealth at the household level. Second, we 
explore whether the wealth of entrepreneurial households can be shown to be causally 
related to entrepreneurship.  
 
x Our findings show that entrepreneurial households are richer, in general, than others; 
median total wealth for entrepreneurial households is almost double that of employee 
households (£246,000 vs £475,000). More than 20% of entrepreneurial employer 
households are in the top decile of wealth and more than 50% are within the three 
highest deciles of wealth. At the other end of the scale, entrepreneurial employer 
households have virtually no representation in the lowest three deciles. In contrast, 
self-employed households and employee households are more or less evenly 
distributed across the various deciles of household wealth, while more than half of 
unemployed households (those where the main respondent is unemployed) are in the 
lowest two deciles.  
 
x Entrepreneurial employer households account for only 2% (about half a million) of all 
UK households, but collectively own 4% of total household wealth. Similarly, self-
employed households account for 6% (almost 1.5 million) of all UK households, but 
collectively own 7% of total household wealth. Between them, the two 
entrepreneurial groups comprise 8% of households, but own 15% of household 
property wealth, 13% of net financial wealth and 12% of physical wealth. 
 
x Entrepreneurial households hold significant portions of their wealth in property; 
however, they also have higher property liabilities than other households, indicating 
larger mortgages, the ownership of multiple properties (e.g. buy to lets), or the use of 
property to collateralise business borrowing. 
 
x While frequently described as income-poor, this study shows that entrepreneurial 
households are asset-rich. Wealth holdings in a variety of forms can be used to 
supplement household budgets in the short and long-term, smoothing consumption for 
the household and providing a credit cushion for the business. Further, greater 
physical wealth, such as motor vehicles and collectibles, suggests that entrepreneurial 
households enjoy a higher standard of living than other households.  
 
x Concerns that entrepreneurs may be particularly prone to financial precarity in old age 
may be over-stated. Our estimates suggest that as a group, entrepreneurial households 
account for 8% of total pension wealth - proportionate with the incidence of 
5 
 
entrepreneurial households in the population. However, while the median employer 
household has £73,000 (mean £210,000) in pension wealth, the median self-employed 
household has only £38,000 (mean £190,000). In comparison, the median employee 
household has £77,000 (mean £220,000) in pension savings.  
 
x While the high variability in pension saving among the self-employed may leave 
many at the risk of financial insecurity later in life, for provident entrepreneurs the 
ownership of property and other wealth forms may constitute a more diversified and 
versatile wealth portfolio that may supplement formal pension savings. 
 
x Prior studies of entrepreneurial incomes have stressed the large variations in fortunes 
among entrepreneurs, suggesting that mean incomes are skewed by a handful of very 
KLJKHDUQLQJµVXSHUVWDUV¶. In contrast, this analysis of entrepreneurial wealth finds that 
inequalities in total wealth distribution are actually lower among employers (Gini 
coefficient = 0.58) and the self-employed (0.57) than they are among the inactive 
(0.81) and the unemployed (0.74). Indeed, wealth inequalities among employers and 
the self-employed are on a par with wealth inequalities among employees (0.58).  
 
x The extent to which the greater wealth observed among entrepreneurial households 
can be directly attributed to entrepreneurship is more difficult to demonstrate and 
prone to substantial methodological difficulties. However, our estimates suggest that 
for households at the median level of wealth, entrepreneurship can more than double 
household wealth (an increase of around £380,000 on the £340,000 unweighted 
median wealth). The impact of entrepreneurship on household wealth is seemingly 
even greater at higher levels of household wealth. Estimates of IHS and log 
transformed wealth suggests that entrepreneurship could triple household wealth for 
households at the 75th percentile; an increase of 300%, 600% and 700% is estimated 
at the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles respectively. 
 
x These results suggest that entrepreneurship has a cumulative effect on household 
wealth; entrepreneurship makes wealthy households wealthier but has no effect on the 
wealth of households below the median level. In this light, traditional views of 
entrepreneurship as a middle class occupation continue to have salience. In contrast, 
no evidence was found to show that entrepreneurship is an effective vehicle for 
enhancing social mobility among poorer households. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
That entrepreneurship can lead to great personal wealth is demonstrated by the 
number of individual success stories reported in the popular media. In recent years, up to 
80% of the Forbes List of the wealthiest Americans has comprised business owners, while 
most of the others inherited their wealth, typically made from businesses started by their 
SDUHQWV RU JUDQGSDUHQWV &DJHWWL 	 'H 1DUGL  7KH 8.¶V Sunday Times Rich List 
includes similarly high numbers of business owners and their immediate descendants (Shaw 
et al, 2013). But it is also evident that not all entrepreneurs are successful or wealthy. Risk is 
a defining characteristic of entrepreneurship, leading to great variability in the fortunes of 
entrepreneurs. Despite this, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which 
entrepreneurship leads to personal wealth for individuals who have started businesses. While 
there has been a growing interest in entrepreneurial earnings, this has focused mainly on 
measuring the relative incomes of entrepreneurs, rather than overall wealth measured by the 
stock of personal assets which may prove a more accurate measure of entrepreneurial 
earnings.  
This study presents the first attempt to assess the relative wealth of entrepreneurs, 
examining two key questions critical to the entrepreneurial earnings debate. Firstly, we 
examine the magnitude, composition and distribution of entrepreneurial wealth. Using the 
UK Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), a longitudinal population survey, as the main data 
source, we compare the wealth of two types of entrepreneurs, business owners with 
employees (employers) and self-employed individuals with no employees (self-employed), 
with remaining population groups, measuring wealth at the household level. Secondly, 
EXLOGLQJ RQ SULRU VWXGLHV WKDW KDYH IRXQG D ³WLJKW UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ EHLQJ an 
µHQWUHSUHQHXU¶DQGEHLQJ ULFK´ &DJHWWL	'H1DUGLZHDWWHPSW WRGLVHQWDQJOH
the extent to which household wealth is an outcome of entrepreneurship. In so doing, we 
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provide a more nuanced understanding of the financial rewards of entrepreneurship, 
contributing new insights that move the field beyond the µentrepreneurial incomes puzzle¶ 
that has preoccupied scholars to date.  
Following this introduction, the paper reviews prior research that has contributed to 
our current understanding of entrepreneurial earnings, and then describes the dataset and our 
analytical method. The results of our analysis are reported in two parts. The first reports 
descriptive data on the size, composition and distribution of wealth owned by entrepreneurial 
households relative to that owned by others, and the second reports evidence pertaining to a 
causal relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship. Finally, we provide conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2 ENTREPRENEURIAL EARNINGS: INCOMES VS WEALTH  
There is growing research interest in entrepreneurial earnings and the financial 
rewards that may be derived from entrepreneurship. To date, the main focus of investigation 
has been the incomes derived from self-employment and business ownership relative to those 
derived from employment (Shane, 2008). Studies of entrepreneurial incomes offer diverse 
results. Several early studies reported consistently lower earnings among the self-employed 
(Hamilton, 2000; Blanchflower, 2004) and posed the question that has become known as the 
entrepreneurial earnings puzzle; why so many individuals choose to remain in self-
employment given the considerably higher earnings available to them in paid employment 
(Shane, 2008). More recent studies have started to address this puzzle by improving the 
methodological approach taken to studying entrepreneurial incomeV $VWHEUR DQG &KHQ¶V
(2014) study of US entrepreneurs argued that the widely reported low incomes derived from 
entrepreneurship were largely a function of the systematic under-reporting of earnings, while 
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6RUJQHU HW DO¶V  DQDO\VLV RI *HUPDQ PLFUR-census data focused on unpacking the 
single, heterogeneous category of entrepreneurs into a number of different analytical groups. 
By controlling for measurement issues and disaggregating different types of entrepreneurial 
activities, these studies concluded that entrepreneurial earnings were often comparable, albeit 
with greater variability, to those gained in paid employment. As Sorgner et al (2014: 21) 
UHSRUW ³WKe common assertion that self-employed persons tend to earn less than paid 
employees does not hold true. Despite considerable heterogeneity, many but not all self-
HPSOR\HGHDUQPRUH´ 
Although incomes are a useful measure of relative prosperity, particularly for those in 
paid employment whose earnings are typically their main or sole income source, the use of 
incomes as the measure of the financial rewards of entrepreneurship is highly problematic. 
Economic well-being is a multi-dimensional construct, of which incomes constitute only one 
element (Carter, 2011). Entrepreneurs have considerable discretion in determining not only 
the type, but also the value and the timing of their personal financial rewards (Carter and 
Welter, 2015). Incomes in the form of drawings are one type of financial reward that may be 
derived from business ownership, but the financial rewards of entrepreneurship include both 
direct financial rewards (i.e. drawings, net profit, shareholder dividends and equity sale), and 
a range of indirect rewards, including goods and services owned by the firm but used for 
personal and household consumption. The extraction of financial rewards may be adjusted to 
VXLW SUHYDLOLQJ EXVLQHVV FRQGLWLRQV DQG WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V LQGLYLGXDO UHTXLUHPHQWV )RU
example, frugal entrepreneurs may typically extract notional drawings, but the amount may 
vary depending on personal needs and the affordability to the business. Similarly, the value 
and timing of more substantial financial rewards, such as dividends and profit, may be varied 
by the judicious entrepreneur to suit prevailing business conditions and to maximize personal 
and business advantage. Arguably, the ability to vary the value, form and timing of financial 
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rewards extracted from the business is a distinguishing feature of entrepreneurship (Carter 
and Welter, 2015). Hence, research that focuses only on incomes is unlikely to be sufficient 
to fully address the entrepreneurial earnings puzzle.  
While income can be viewed as a flow of economic resources, comprising money 
received over a particular period of time, wealth is a stock of economic resources in the form 
of accumulated personal assets (Rowlingson, 2012). As such, wealth constitutes a more stable 
and reliable measure of relative success and economic well-being over the life-course of the 
business and the individual entrepreneur. While the use of wealth as a measure of the 
financial rewards of entrepreneurship resolves many of the measurement and under-reporting 
issues commonly associated with studies of entrepreneurial incomes, it introduces other 
challenges and complexities. Most obviously, the distinction between income and wealth can 
be ambiguous as some assets provide a source of income (e.g. interest on savings), while 
income flows may be converted into assets (e.g. saved income). Assets also vary greatly in 
liquidity and fungibility; while pension assets are typically illiquid, housing assets can be 
used to collateralise business debt, and financial assets readily available for business 
purposes. Additionally, wealth can be negative; debt can be collateralised against the value of 
an asset to leverage funds for further investment (Rowlingson, 2012: 8). Finally and most 
problematically from a measurement perspective, the source of accumulated wealth may be 
misattributed to entrepreneurial success, but may actually derive from other sources. While 
these issues present methodological challenges, there are obvious advantages in focusing on 
WKHDFFXPXODWHGVWRFNRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VHFRQRPLFUHVRXUFHVUDWKHUthan income flows, as a 
more reliable indicator of the financial rewards of entrepreneurship.     
 It is widely recognised that the distribution of wealth is highly unequal, and in most 
countries wealth distribution is more unequal than income distribution. On a global level, 
wealth share estimates show that the richest 1% of individuals account for 40% of global 
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wealth, while the richest 10% account for 85% of global wealth (Davies et al, 2007). Those in 
the top decile are, on average, 400 times richer than the bottom 50% (Davies et al., 2007). In 
the UK, studies of wealth show that the most unequal type of wealth is financial wealth, 
followed by private pension wealth and property wealth (Rowlingson, 2012). The wealthiest 
individuals are typically in the 55-64 year age group - though considerable inequality exists 
within this age group - typically because older people have had more time to accumulate 
assets than younger people (Birmingham Policy Commission on the Distribution of Wealth, 
2013). Large variations in wealth are also apparent by occupation, with entrepreneurs 
frequently found to be among the wealthiest (Cagetti & De Nardi, 2006; Quadrini, 2000).  
Prior research has shown that the concentration of wealth owned by entrepreneurs 
cannot be explained by their incomes, which are disproportionately lower (Quadrini, 2000). 
Instead, two alternative explanations of entrepreneurial wealth have been proposed. Firstly, 
there is evidence that the greater wealth of entrepreneurs is a result of different patterns of 
accumulation and higher levels of savings (Bradford, 2003; Cagetti & De Nardi, 2006; 
Quadrini, 2000). Entrepreneurs may have access to large lump sum payments through 
shareholder dividends and also have a greater incentive to save, both because of their need to 
offset future earnings risks and also to reduce the requirement for external finance (Gentry & 
Hubbard, 2004; Parker et al, 2005).  Secondly, there is some evidence that the wealth of 
entrepreneurial households is not only an outcome of successful entrepreneurship it is also an 
input, providing capital facilitating business start-up and growth. Wealthy households have 
access to financial assets reducing borrowing constraints (Gentry & Hubbard, 2004; Nanda, 
2008). In contrast, non-wealthy households may experience credit rationing and their reliance 
on external finance may constrain venture start-up and growth (Freel, 2007; Levenson & 
Willard, 2000; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).   
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Sources of wealth are varied, but can be categorised as either earned through saved 
income or unearned through gifts or price effects (Rowlingson, 2012). The accumulation of 
wealth usually, but not always, occurs over time as individuals earn more than they spend, 
saving residual income in order to smooth future consumption, or by price effect gains in 
property or share prices. Less commonly, wealth accrues through sudden windfalls, such as 
inheritance or lottery wins. Whatever its source, there is little doubt that the possession of 
wealth reduces the need for external borrowing and also provides collateral to securitise 
external credit (Birmingham Policy Commission on the Distribution of Wealth, 2013). 
Because wealth comprises a stock of different types of assets usually built over time, it 
provides a more durable resource to measure relative success and economic wellbeing over 
the life-course of the business and the individual entrepreneur. In contrast, income is a fluid 
asset prone to rapid out-flows and under-reporting.   
A key question relating to wealth is whether it should be measured at the level of the 
individual, the family or the household (Rowlingson, 2012). Studies have increasingly 
recognised the role of families and households in supporting business ventures and the extent 
of sharing within entrepreneurial households (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Alsos et al, 2014).  In 
this study we focus on the household, but recognise the additional complexity this entails, as 
the wealth observed within a household may not derive solely or mainly from the business, 
but may have accrued from other sources including, for example, spousal wealth (Carter, 
2011; Mulholland, 1996). Following an examination of the size, composition and distribution 
of the relative wealth of entrepreneurs, we explore the extent to which household wealth is an 
outcome of entrepreneurship. 
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3 DATA AND METHODS 
This study employs data drawn from Wave 2 of the Wealth and Assets Survey 
(WAS), a longitudinal general population survey conducted by the UK Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) that collects household and personal level data pertaining to wealth. Wave 1 
was carried out between July 2006 and June 2008 and achieved a sample of 30,595 
households and 71,268 individuals. The survey has a two yearly interval, such that Wave 2 
commenced in July 2008 through June 2010. Wave 2 achieved a sample of 20,170 
households (of which 18,910 can be linked to Wave 1) and 46,347 individuals. The present 
study considers variables at the household level; some, such as wealth, are only collected at 
the household level, others are aJJUHJDWLRQVRIKRXVHKROGPHPEHUV¶UHVSRQVHVZKLOHRWKHUV
only pertain to the individual responses of the Household Reference Person (HRP). The HRP 
is defined as the person within a given household chosen to represent the household and 
characterise the houVHKROG¶V VRFLDO SRVLWLRQ XVLQJ KLVKHU LQGLYLGXDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV ZLWK
priority given to the individual with the highest income in the household (ONS, 2013). We 
employ only Wave 2 data as certain key questions of relevance to the present study, such as 
the respondents family background, were introduced in Wave 2. Our variables of interest are 
household wealth (dependent variable) and entrepreneurial households (independent 
variable).  
Households were divided into six categories based on the economic activity of the 
HRP: economically inactive, pensioners, unemployed, employees, self-employed with no 
employees (self-employed) and business owners with employees (employers). While 
pensioners, the economically inactive, and the unemployed are self-explanatory, the 
distinction between employees, self-employed and employers is crucial, especially with 
regard to notions of entrepreneurship and business-ownership. A person whose main current 
occupational status is captured in the dataset as sole director of own company, partner, self-
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employed or a director with ownership in a company with less than 500 employees was 
categorised as an entrepreneur. Company directors that have no ownership were categorised 
as employees, and employees with ownership are not captured in the data as the filtered 
question on proportion of ownership only targets directors. Entrepreneurs are therefore 
owner-managers of businesses, i.e. those that combine some degree of ownership and a 
strategic managerial position as director or partner. Within this broad category, the self-
employed group captures those that employ only themselves or themselves and fellow 
partners but no employees. In turn, employers are any owner-managers whose firms have 
employees. Importantly, where an individual is a business owner but such ownership does not 
entail a formal managerial capacity, such an individual is not captured in these occupational 
groups. Thus, the six categories are essentially employment status indicators.  
In the descriptive analysis of household wealth, we use these six occupational 
categories for the whole sample of British households. In the regression analyses, however, 
entrepreneurial households are defined as those where the HRP is either self-employed or is 
an owner-manager of a business with fewer than 500 employees (i.e. is an entrepreneur as 
defined above). This is primarily because there is an analytical need to observe 
entrepreneurial households as a binary variable. Further, in the regression analysis, we 
consider a sub-sample of households with working-age HRPs that are either employees or 
entrepreneurs. Conventionally, working-age includes individuals aged between 16 - 64 years 
(16 ± 59 years for women); however, since data on family background was only sought from 
respondents that were at least 25 years old, we consider 25 years as the lower threshold for 
working-age HRPs. A further subsample of working working-age HRPs also eliminates 
households whose HRPs are either inactive or unemployed. This is partly because data on 
certain factors are only collected from working respondents. Being primarily age-related, a 
working-age sub-population is rather straightforward. However, there may be selection bias 
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issues with the working sub-sample should there be unobserved factors associated with both 
household wealth and not working. The wealth of the highly heterogeneous group of 
economically inactive may be especially problematic in this regard.  
Besides selection, in seeking to establish whether entrepreneurship is causally 
associated with household wealth, there are three further main analytical concerns. The first 
two relate to negative wealth and the distribution of wealth. While most quantitative analyses 
employ the natural logarithm transformation to make skewed data more amenable to analysis 
and inference, wealth measures contain legitimate negative and zero values thereby making 
the log transformation unsuitable. Since wealth is not normally distributed in the population, 
researchers do not ordinarily employ means and mean-based linear methods to analyse wealth 
- medians and quantile regressions are deemed more suitable. Thus, non-positive wealth is 
often converted to a low positive figure (frequently one pecuniary unit, e.g. £1) and then 
logged. The support for this is that such transformation does not change the rankings of the 
pertinent observations and does not therefore distort the population median. Pence (2006), 
however, contends that this not only misrepresents the population, since instances of negative 
wealth do exist in the population, but also underestimates the true median regression standard 
errors since variability in the data is reduced. Truncating the data at the value of one also 
means that studies at lower quantiles of the response variable cannot be estimated, even when 
understanding the relationship between variables at the lower quantiles may be highly 
relevant. Following Burbidge et al, (1988) among others, Pence (2006) advances the use of 
the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) as a transformation suitable for responses with negative 
values, such as wealth. Another option is the cube-root transformation (Cox, 2011).  
The third issue pertains to the potentially endogenous relationship between 
entrepreneurship and wealth. It is well documented that entrepreneurial households tend to be 
richer (Cagetti & De Nardi, 2006; Carter, 2011); however, since wealthy households are more 
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likely to become entrepreneurs, not least because wealth enables the supply of capital 
required for start-up, entrepreneurship is endogenous in wealth. Where interest focuses on 
whether entrepreneurship makes households wealthier an instrumental variable approach is 
therefore imperative. In prior studies of entrepreneurship, parental variables have been 
employed as instruments for the endogenous variables pertaining to the entrepreneur (Coad et 
al, 2014; Dahl & Sorenson, 2012). This approach was also used in this analysis, as is 
explained below.  
In view of these analytical considerations, the most appropriate approach to 
investigate whether entrepreneurship leads to higher wealth is an instrumental variable 
quantile regression with sample selection. Although Frölich and Melly (2010) have 
developed an Instrumental Variable Quantile Treatment Effects (IVQTE) module within 
STATA, an accurate implementation of such a strategy in the presence of sample selection is 
still challenging for three reasons. Firstly, the standard Heckman correction may not be 
appropriate in a quantile regression framework as its distributional assumptions are not 
consistent with the inherent heterogeneity that necessitates the quantile regression approach 
in the first place (Huber & Melly, 2011). Although advances have been made in this regard 
following (Buchinsky, 1998, 2001), this issue remains unsettled (Huber & Melly, 2011). 
Indeed, modules to estimate this within STATA, the analytical software we employ in the 
present study, are yet to be developed and potentially relevant user-written codes caution that 
they are as yet computationally overlong and complicated (see for example, Souabni, 2013).  
For this reason, in the present first approximations, we do not correct for selection in the 
quantile regressions and instead caveat our results as applying only to the selected sub-
populations.  
The second issue concerns instruments for entrepreneurial HRPs. Frölich and Melly 
(2008; 2010) identify four key assumptions that an instrumental variable should satisfy. 
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These are: compliance (some HRPs become entrepreneurs because their parents were 
themselves entrepreneurs); monotonicity and non-defiance (although having parents that 
were entrepreneurs may not have the effect of making the respective HRPs  pursue 
entrepreneurship,  having entrepreneurial parents does not make certain HRPs  seek 
employment instead); exclusion and unconfoundedness (having entrepreneurial parents does 
not affect the HRPs household wealth directly or indirectly); and, independence (having 
entrepreneurial parents does not systematically influence the distribution of other HRP and  
household attributes). 
Much of the extant empirical work supports the idea that children of entrepreneurs are 
likely to become entrepreneurs themselves (Colombier & Masclet, 2008; Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003; Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Fairlie & Robb, 2007). Parental entrepreneurial 
status is thus considered a good instrument since children that become entrepreneurs because 
their parents were are µFRPSOiers¶. That is, taking parental entrepreneurship to be a 
µtreatment¶, in becoming entrepreneurs, such children comply with such treatment and their 
status changes accordingly, satisfying Assumption 1. Although Aldrich et al. (1998) have 
argued that entrepreneurial parents may not always pass on entrepreneurial privilege to their 
children, and it is not unusual for children of entrepreneurs not to become entrepreneurs, to 
the extent that the non-entrepreneurial status of such children is not directly attributable to the 
QHJDWLYH HIIHFW RI WKHLU SDUHQWV¶ HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VWDWXV Assumption 2 on monotonicity and 
absence of defiance is not violated. However, there may be cases where children of 
entrepreneurs shun entrepreneurship altogether because they (or their parents) experienced 
undesirable effects, such as working long hours or financial risk. Others may also consider 
WKHLU SDUHQWV¶ EXVLQHVVes to be old-fashioned or uninteresting and therefore elect to pursue 
different careers rather succeed their parents (see, for example, Anuradha, 2004; Parrilli, 
2009). The presence of such cases constitutes defiance which undermines Assumption 2.  
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Assumption 3 may also be violated where entrepreneurial parents afford wealth to 
their children not just directly, but also through other factors such as inheritance or 
unobserved social capital. Here, however, the direct effect can be investigated empirically. 
Further, the indirect effects may be mitigated by controlling extensively for other factors, 
such as inheritance, which more or less randomise the instrument (Frölich & Melly, 2008). A 
random instrument also ensures that assumption 4 is satisfied. In any event, most of the other 
household and HRP attributes that may affect wealth are factors such as age, ethnicity, gender 
and family background. It is unlikely, therefore, that their distribution in the population is 
influenced by having entrepreneurial parents. In all, while it is widely appreciated that 
implementing instrumental variables is a challenge in empirical analysis (see for example, 
Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995), this approach may help recover the causal effects of 
entrepreneurship on household wealth.  
The third concern with the implementation of the IVQTE model in the present study 
is that we employ survey data but the IVQTE model does not as yet allow the estimations to 
be adjusted in line with the survey design.  Thus, accounting for sample weights and 
clustered observations, and therefore standard errors, is not accommodated within IVQTE. 
Nevertheless, since our study investigates wealth over its distributional profile and we know 
that the WAS survey deliberately oversampled richer households, we expect that the sample 
median is higher than the population median and can thus qualify the inferences accordingly. 
Thus, although the point estimates and standard errors, and therefore what returns as 
statistically significant,  may not be correctly estimated, the results are still informative given 
especially the  large sample size. Bootstrapping with resampling within clusters enabled has 
been found to significantly improve the estimates of standard errors (see for example, Shih & 
Konrad, 2007), and was also implemented.  
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4 ANALYSIS 
4.1 The magnitude, composition and distribution of household wealth among 
occupational groups 
As the weighted statistics in Table 1 shows, in the period 2008/2010, there were 
almost 25 million households in Great Britain sharing among them a total of almost £11 
trillion in household wealth.1  Table 2 presents wealth at the household level. The median 
British household had about £230,000 in household wealth. That the distribution of wealth is 
highly skewed is attested to by the magnitude of the difference between the mean and the 
median of total wealth. At about £414,000, the mean is more than 75% larger than the 
median. This suggests that while the majority of the population owns modest wealth, there 
are a few households with very high amounts of wealth who pull up the average. This trend is 
common among all occupational groups but is perhaps most marked in  households in the 
inactive category,  which includes,  among others, people who cannot participate in the 
labour market because of  illness or disability, persons looking after the family home and 
those that have taken early retirement (Leaker, 2009).  
  
 
 
                                                 
1 Wealth is inflated to 2012 calendar year prices using UK GDP deflators obtained from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gdp-deflators-at-market-prices-and-money-gdp-march-2013.  
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Table 1: The Distribution of Occupational Categories of British Households and Their Wealth by HRP  
 
Table 2: Mean and Median Household Wealth by the Occupational Category of the HRP (at current prices) 
 
 HRP occupational category 
Total household 
wealth Property wealth Physical wealth 
Net Financial 
wealth Pension  wealth 
Motor vehicle 
wealth 
Total financial 
liabilities 
Property 
liabilities 
Employment status Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Inactive 331,460  36,809  82,963  0 29,004  16,000  42,718  200  176,775  0  3,803  500  2,445  120  9,529  0 
Pensioners 413,181  264,663  159,608  139,999  38,156  30,000  53,202  13,105  162,215  48,645  3,623  1,000  731  0 3,656  0 
Unemployed 123,585  26,893  42,611  0 21,484  15,000  8,034  -141  51,455  0  2,005  0 3,457  464  15,089  0 
Employees 420,685  246,870  123,026  80,000  42,511  35,500  36,369  5,715  218,780  77,006  7,060  4,000  5,397  960  59,158  29,500  
Selfemployed 508,115  287,250  200,369  128,000  54,085  41,000  59,806  9,850  193,855  38,921  9,276  6,000  5,445  458  66,078  22,000  
Employers 774,283  475,700  371,882  213,563  80,093  59,000  110,362  33,606  211,946  72,738  16,508  9,750  6,591  400 131,511  73,000 
Total Sample 413,825  232,380  136,048  89,999  40,798  32,500  43,776  6,400  193,552  52,469  5,990  3,000  3,812  40  39,741  0 
 
HRP 
occupational 
category 
No. of 
house-
holds 
('000) 
% 
Share 
British household wealth (2008/10) in £ Millions in 2012 prices 
Total 
Household 
wealth 
% 
Share 
Property 
wealth 
% 
Share 
Physical 
wealth 
% 
Share 
Net 
Financial 
wealth 
% 
Share 
Collecti
bles 
% 
Share 
Motor 
vehicles 
% 
Share 
Pensions 
% 
Share 
Inactive 2,800 11% 976,000 9% 245,000 7% 85,800 8% 125,000 11% 3,960 10% 11,200 7% 520,000 10% 
Pensioners 6,500 26% 2,860,000 26% 1,110,000 31% 264,000 24% 369,000 32% 10,000 24% 25,100 16% 1,120,000 22% 
Unemployed 630 3% 83,100 1% 28,700 1% 14,400 1% 5,400 0% 477 1% 1,340 1% 34,600 1% 
Employees 13,000 52% 5,790,000 53% 1,690,000 47% 584,000 54% 503,000 43% 15,000 36% 97,100 61% 3,010,000 59% 
Selfemployed 1,500 6% 820,000 7% 325,000 9% 86,800 8% 95,800 8% 7,450 18% 14,900 9% 313,000 6% 
Employers 520 2% 433,000 4% 208,000 6% 45,200 4% 61,500 5% 4,450 11% 9,350 6% 118,000 2% 
  24,950 100% 10,962,100 100% 3,606,700 100% 1,080,200 100% 1,159,700 100% 41,337 100% 158,990 100% 5,115,600 100% 
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Between the various occupation groups on aggregate, Table 1 shows that 
entrepreneurial households own more wealth than their representation in society would 
suggest. Although only 2% (about half a million) of households have HRPs who are owner-
managers of small businesses with employees, collectively these households own 4% of total 
household wealth. Similarly, there are almost 1.5 million self-employed HRPs in the UK 
accounting for 6% of households; however, this group owns7% of total household wealth.  
Between them, these two groups, while comprising only 8% of households, own 15% of 
household property wealthy (the sum of all property values minus the value of all outstanding 
mortgages and amounts owed as a result of equity release), 13% of net financial wealth 
(formal and informal financial assets less non-mortgage debt), and 12% of physical wealth 
(including household contents, collectibles and valuables, and motor vehicles). In particular, 
entrepreneurial households own 15% of the values of all household motor vehicles and 
almost 30% of all household valuables and collectibles.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the different household occupational groups within 
the different wealth deciles. While the share of self-employed households is not markedly 
different across the different deciles of wealth, households comprising business owners with 
employees (employers) do not feature in the lower deciles and their representation is greater 
in the upper wealth deciles. Figure 2 illustrates this further. Within the totality of employer 
households, more than 20% are found within the top decile of wealth, with very low 
representation in lower deciles of household wealth. Indeed, more than 50% of employers are 
within the three highest deciles and there is virtually no representation in the lowest three 
deciles, suggesting a strong positive relationship between employing entrepreneurs and 
household wealth. In contrast, self-employed and employee households are fairly  evenly 
distributed across the  wealth spectrum, while more than half of households with an 
unemployed HRP are to be found in the lowest two deciles. That employers are wealthier is 
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not particularly surprising; As Knight ([1921] 2006) observed, the ability to give satisfactory 
guarantees of the contractual incomes promised to employees and other suppliers is 
fundamental in entrepreneurship.  
 
Figure 1: Representation of Occupational Groups in Different Wealth Deciles 
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Wealth within Different Economic Groups 
 
 
Curiously, more than 10% of households where the HRP is categorised as 
economically inactive belong in the wealthiest decile in society. This may be explained by 
early retirement by rich individuals, or the financial contributions by other household 
members. However, it has been noted that the economically inactive group is highly diverse 
(Leaker, 2009). Table 3 depicts this further showing the distribution of wealth inequality for 
those with positive values using Gini coefficient, the main measure of the distribution of 
wealth across populations. While total wealth across the overall population showed a Gini 
coefficient of 0.6, the highest levels of inequality were seen within the inactive (0.81) and 
unemployed (0.74) groups. Inequality in total wealth was lower among pensioners (0.57), the 
self-employed (0.57) and employees (0.58), and even lower among business-owners 
(employers) (0.53) perhaps given that employers are relatively rich in the first place as 
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alluded to above. While prior studies have stressed the large variations in entrepreneurial 
fortunes, suggesting that mean incomes are skewed by a handful of very high earning 
µVXSHUVWDUV¶, this analysis of wealth distribution suggests that wealth inequalities are actually 
lower among business owners and the self-employed than they are among the inactive and the 
unemployed. Indeed, wealth inequalities among business owners and the self-employed are 
on a par with, indeed, slightly less than, wealth inequalities among employees.  Inequalities in 
the distribution of wealth were highest when considering wealth in the firm of collectibles 
(0.75) and net financial wealth (0.74), and lowest when considering property wealth (0.45) 
and physical wealth (0.45). 
 
Table 3: The Distribution of Wealth (within Groups and within the Population) 
 
Gini coefficients (0-1; 0 = complete equality, 1= complete inequality) 
 
Total 
wealth 
Property 
wealth 
Physical 
wealth 
Net 
Financial 
wealth 
Pensions 
wealth 
Collectibles  
wealth 
Motor 
vehicle 
wealth 
Total 
liabilities 
Property 
liabilities 
Inactive 0.81 0.44 0.56 0.88 0.74 0.84 0.61 0.71 0.56 
Pensioners 0.57 0.35 0.44 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.55 0.74 0.62 
Unemployed 0.74 0.44 0.53 0.85 0.71 0.67 0.54 0.70 0.46 
Employees 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.52 0.61 0.43 
Selfemployed 0.57 0.48 0.43 0.72 0.70 0.77 0.49 0.62 0.45 
Employers 0.53 0.55 0.43 0.68 0.66 0.78 0.52 0.63 0.45 
Overall Population 0.60 0.45 0.45 0.74 0.67 0.75 0.54 0.65 0.45 
 
Further, while prior research suggests that entrepreneurs may be particularly prone to 
financial risk in their old age '¶$UF\DQG*DUGLQHU, our estimates (Table 1) suggest 
that as a group, entrepreneurial households account for 8% of total pension wealth which is 
proportionate with the incidence of entrepreneurial households in the population. However, 
while '¶$UF\ DQG *DUGLQHU (2014) consider the individual pensions of entrepreneurs, the 
Wealth and Assets Survey observes total pensions at the household level. Consequently, 
some pension wealth accredited to entrepreneurial households may have been accumulated 
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by spouses. Although the median employee household has about £77,000 (mean £220,000) in 
pension savings and the employing business owner household has about £73,000 (mean 
£210,000), the median self-employed household has accumulated only about half as much 
pension wealth (£38,000, mean £190,000). While self-employed households may not be 
significantly worse off in terms of pension savings on average, there is high variability in 
pension saving among the self-employed which may leave many at risk of financial 
insecurity later in life. Indeed Table 3 shows that inequality in pension wealth is very high 
among the self-employed, with only the inactive and unemployed groups with exhibiting 
higher pension inequality.  
Nevertheless, with significantly higher levels of wealth overall, especially property 
wealth, it may be the case that provident entrepreneurs invest in property and other assets and 
hold a generally more diversified and versatile wealth portfolio besides formal pension 
schemes. As Table 4 shows, not only do entrepreneurial households hold significant portions 
of their wealth in property while employees have more of their wealth in pensions, 
entrepreneurial households also have higher property liabilities. This suggests that larger 
mortgages may be used to finance either more expensive homes or the ownership of multiple 
properties (e.g. buy to lets), re-mortgaging to raise capital, or the use of household property 
as business collateral. With higher financial wealth, physical wealth and property wealth, 
entrepreneurial households that are frequently argued to be µincome poor¶ (see, Carter, 2011, 
for a review), can instead be seen to hold a variety of assets that can be used  to supplement 
household budgets in the short, medium and long-term.  While it is clear that employers 
constitute the wealthiest of all the occupational categories, descriptive analysis cannot 
determine whether the wealth observed among business owners is a consequence or an 
antecedent of their entrepreneurial activities and whether the munificence of entrepreneurship 
holds across the distribution of wealth. 
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Table 4: The Composition of Household Wealth 
 
 
$VDVKDUHRIWRWDOKRXVHKROGZHDOWK« (mean/ median of household shares) 
  
Property 
wealth 
Physical 
wealth 
Net 
Financial 
wealth 
Pension  
wealth 
Motor 
vehicle 
wealth 
Total 
financial 
liabilities 
Property 
liabilities 
Socio-econ 
group Mn  Md Mn  Md Mn  Md Mn  Md Mn  Md Mn  Md Mn  Md 
Inactive 14% 0% 72% 42% -11% 1% 25% 0% 3% 0% 21% 0% 5% 0% 
Pensioners 36% 39% 25% 12% 12% 7% 27% 22% 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 
Unemployed 14% 0% 100% 67% -36% 0% 22% 0% 4% 0% 47% 2% 18% 0% 
Employees 27% 26% 30% 14% 4% 3% 39% 38% 5% 2% 6% 0% 45% 6% 
Selfemployed 39% 41% 25% 15% 11% 5% 24% 16% 4% 2% 0% 0% 16% 5% 
Employers 45% 47% 18% 12% 13% 6% 24% 19% 4% 2% 1% 0% 37% 16% 
Total Sample 29% 27% 35% 14% 4% 4% 32% 27% 4% 1% 7% 0% 27% 0% 
 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis  
Towards investigating the causal effect of entrepreneurship on household wealth, the 
primary specification for the present study is: 
HWealthi =Į ȕEntrepreneuri + ȜXi İi       (1) 
HWealthi is total household wealth owned by household i measured in 2012 GB Pounds 
divided by ten thousand (£¶s) and transformed accordingly. Entrepreneuri  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the household reference person is an entrepreneur (either self-
employed or owner-manager with employees) and zero otherwise indicating whether  
household i  is an entrepreneurial household. The vector Xi includes other observable 
determinants of household wealth and İi is the error term with assumptions corresponding to 
the pertinent specification. HRP characteristics included in Xi  are: age, gender, education, 
industry, health (whether they have a long-term illness or disability), ethnicity, country of 
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birth, religion and whether they or their partner have ever received an inheritance or a lump-
sum payment from gambling, redundancy, insurance, compensation claim payments or 
PRQH\ JLIWV LQ H[FHVV RI  +53¶V IDPLO\ EDFNJURXQG IDFWRUV LQFOXGH whether their 
father or mother was an entrepreneur, IDWKHU¶VDQGPRWKHU¶V HGXFDWLRQ, number of siblings, 
and their famil\¶V tenure of accommodation when the HRP was a teenager. Other household 
factors such as type of household, education of other householders, total number of working 
householders, and whether there are cases of long-term illness in the household are also 
controlled for, as are broader contextual factors including region, whether rural/urban and 
calendar year.  
 As a starting point, we sought to explore the linear relationship between 
entrepreneurship and household wealth (using the inverse hyperbolic sine, the natural 
logarithm and the cube root of wealth) using the standard OLS estimator. In these 
estimations, standard OLS assumptions pertaining to the mean and distribution of residuals 
were not supported. This means that assuming the models were correctly specified and the 
employed transformations effectively mitigated the skewness in wealth data (and therefore 
the errors thereof), a linear relationship between the identified variables and wealth cannot be 
fitted accurately and therefore that other techniques should be more appropriate.  
In Table A1, Model 1 shows the results unweighted, Model 2 incorporates sample 
weights but no clusters, Model 3 accounts for both sample weights and clusters, and Model 4 
clusters standard errors but does not weight the data. Model 5 uses both sample weights and 
clusters and corrects for selection of working HRP households in the wealth estimations. All 
else equal, there is no evidence that entrepreneurial households are richer. Further, the models 
show the differences in the point estimates, standard errors and statistical significance across 
the different models. In particular, with sample weights considered, there is evidence of 
selectivity (Chi-sq= 321.70, p-value= 0.000) and most coefficients in the wealth equation are 
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indeed noticeably different once the selectivity is accounted for. This suggests that 
unobserved factors associated with being in the working working-age group are also in part 
responsible for some of the variability in wealth and that for those selected, these unobserved 
effects will bias the estimated coefficients. 
A further important assumption that is potentially violated is that of exogeneity, since 
entrepreneurship may be endogenous in wealth. To be able to implement a treatment effects 
model towards recovering elements of entrepreneurial households that are not correlated with 
household wealth residuals, we run a first stage regression to establish that our instruments 
are appropriate. OLS linear probability regression results shown in Table 4 indicate a strong 
FRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ+53¶VIDWKHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDOVWDWXVDQGWKH+53¶VRZQHQWUHSUHQHXULDO
status, and a strong F-statistic. This LV HVSHFLDOO\ WKH FDVH ZKHQ +53¶V PRWKHU¶V
entrepreneurial status is dropped, confirming the aggravating influence of additional weak 
instruments (Bound et al., 1995).  Column 3 shows that the instrument is stronger for the 
sample, i.e. with data unweighted. Further support for the validity of the instrument is that in 
the OLS results (Table A1)+53¶V IDWKHU¶V HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VWDWXVZDVQRW IRXQG WRKDYHD
significant direct UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH +53¶V KRXVHKROG wealth. While the exclusion 
restriction PD\ EH YLRODWHG VKRXOG +53¶V IDWKHU¶V HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VWDWXV KDYH DQ indirect 
impact on +53¶Vwealth via inheritance (which includes the inheritance of business), this risk 
may be mitigated by the fact that the inheritance variable also captures inheritance received 
E\ WKH +53¶V SDUWQHU 7KLV UHGXFHV WKH HIIHFW RI LQKHULWDQFH RULJLQDWLQJ IURP +53¶V ZLWK
entrepreneurial fathers. Further, number of siblings may also capture other inheritance effects 
thereby reducing the confoundedness of the instrument.  
 
 
  
28 
 
Table 5: Instrument Validity Test 
 
 Dependent variable: HRP entrepreneur (0/1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
HRP father entrepreneur  0.088*** 0.089*** 0.108*** 
(0 = otherwise) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) 
HRP mother entrepreneur  0.010   
(0 = otherwise) (0.021)   
F Stat 21.76 43.46 100.08 
 Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.010 
Observations 10,043 10,043 10,043 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Estimates of average treatment effects suggest that while the instrument may be 
suitable, the hypothesis that no correlation is present between residual determinants of 
household wealth and residual determinants of entrepreneurship cannot be rejected.  
Estimates presented in Table A2 suggest that on average, in the present specification, no 
significant effects of entrepreneurship on household wealth are detected. While it may be the 
case that our instrument is unable to recover true treatment effects, in considering the sub-
population of working working-age HRPs, the treatment is subject to selection bias. Since a 
two-step Heckman correction procedure is not supported with complex survey data, an 
attempt to control for both selectivity and endogeneity was carried out manually in a 
compromise strategy that analyses the data unweighted and thereby overlooks the survey 
design.  
In the first stage, to correct for self-selection of HRPs into the sub-population 
comprising working-age HRPs that are either employees or entrepreneurs, a selection 
equation is estimated manually and the lambda term (the inverse Mills ratio) included in the 
endogenous binary-treatment regression. The resulting Heckman selection correction term in 
the first stage is not significant suggesting that while the unweighted data may not accurately 
representative of the population, since WAS oversamples wealthier households, the 
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subpopulation of working-age HRPs in employment or entrepreneurship is not itself 
systematically undermined by selection bias. Hence, the endogenous treatment estimates are 
carried out directly. In all the three estimates of wealth, the respective likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that the hypothesis of independence between unobserved factors associated with both 
wealth and entrepreneurship is rejected and the use of the specified endogenous treatment 
supported (IHS: Chi-sq=5.23; p-value=0.02; Log wealth for positive values: Chi-sq=7.26; p-
value= 0.007; Curt wealth: Chi-sq=3.316; p-value= 0.06). As Table 6 shows, it is estimated 
that on average, entrepreneurship increases household wealth by 22-26%. The log 
transformed estimate is higher at around 32% but this only considered households with 
positive wealth. 
Coefficients for IHS transformed data approximate the log at large values (in the 
present case above 3 units of wealth, i.e. £30,000) and can therefore be interpreted in 
percentages. At lower values, the IHS approximates a linear (levels) estimation. The extent to 
which the IHS transformation is linear or logarithmic is determined by the scaling parameter 
ș (Pence, 2006). In the present work, we have not applied a scaling parameter (thus ș=1). 
While differences between the IHS and log are quite large at low figures (i.e. those around 
zero), the IHS is largely only a vertical displacement of the log (i.e., ln2ș+lnw, (Pence, 2006) 
at higher values. Since the point at which IHS and log become similar is below the 10th 
percentile of the overall sample (even lower for the working working-age subsample), to 
avoid further transformation of the original data and for ease of analysis and interpretation, a 
scaling parameter is not employed.  
For the cuberoot transformation, the coefficients pertain to the marginal effect 
estimated at the mean of the cuberoot of wealth. To obtain a result that refers to the original 
distribution, we apply the marginal effect at the mean of the cuberoot and then cube both the 
mean cuberoot and result after adding the marginal effect to establish the additive 
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(percentage) effect at the raw wealth level. In the estimates above, the mean of the cuberoot 
of wealth = 3.2 and estimated marginal effect = 0.216 which results in 3.416. The cube of 
mean of cuberoot=32.768 (i.e. £327,680) and the cube of the result after applying the 
marginal effect=39.862. The multiplicative effect=1.216 which is equivalent to a 22% 
increase in mean wealth.  
 
Table 6: Local Average Treatment Effects  
 
Dependent variable = Total household wealth; Endogenous variable = Entrepreneurial household (i.e. HRP is an 
entrepreneur) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES IHS Wealth (QWU¶O
Hhold 
Log 
Wealth 
(QWU¶O
Hhold 
Cuberoot 
Wealth  
(QWU¶O
Hhold 
       
Entrepreneurial 
household  
0.235**  0.282***  0.216*  
(0 = otherwise) (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.113)  
HRP father entrepreneur   0.313***  0.316***  0.315*** 
(0 = otherwise)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.050) 
HRP age (yrs) 0.213*** 0.037** 0.202*** 0.033* 0.170*** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) 
HRP age squared -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HRP Female (0 = Male) -0.123*** -0.334*** -0.111*** -0.335*** -0.129*** -0.335*** 
 (0.028) (0.050) (0.031) (0.050) (0.029) (0.050) 
HRP Qualification; 0=No 
Quals 
      
HRP other qualifications 0.356*** -0.135* 0.385*** -0.128* 0.318*** -0.132* 
 (0.045) (0.069) (0.059) (0.069) (0.046) (0.069) 
HRP Degree 
qualifications 
0.859*** -0.185** 0.886*** -0.175** 0.904*** -0.181** 
 (0.049) (0.077) (0.071) (0.077) (0.051) (0.077) 
       
Observations 9,064 9,064 8,973 8,973 9,064 9,064 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present 
household and contextual factors included in the regression including industry, health, ethnicity, country of 
ELUWKUHOLJLRQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQQXPEHURIVLEOLQJVIDPLO\EDFNJURXQGKRPHWHQXUHSUHVHQW
household type, health of other householders, human capital of other householders, number of householders 
presently working, rural/urban, region and year. 
 
 
As with other transformations, note that the cube of the mean of the cuberoot of 
wealth does not correspond with the untransformed sample mean (which is £577,425 for the 
working-age employees and entrepreneurs sub-sample). Further, unlike the logarithm that 
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changes the nature of the data such that coefficients are interpreted as percentages, since it is 
merely a root of the raw data coefficients pertaining to the cuberoot of wealth should be 
interpreted as absolute changes. Thus, on average, entrepreneurship adds 0.216 (i.e. £2,160) 
to the cuberoot of household wealth. The 22% increase therefore only applies at the cube of 
the mean of the cuberoot of wealth; percentage increases will vary at different values of 
wealth. Since the cuberoot results are similar to the IHS and log transformed results we focus 
especially on the IHS transformed results.  
 
 
4.2.1 Conditional quantile regression analysis 
Because wealth is highly skewed, the distribution of errors may not meet the 
assumptions stipulated for standard linear regressions. Hence, a quantile regression 
estimation strategy may be more appropriate in this analysis. In addition, understanding the 
various effects at different points along the distribution of household wealth in society may 
be more informative. For a binary variable such as ZKHWKHU KRXVHKROGV¶ +53V DUH
entrepreneurs or employees, the difference in wealth prima facie associated with their 
occupational status corresponds to the horizontal distance between the given quantiles in the 
corresponding distributions.  
Figure 3 shows that although both distributions are skewed, in spite of IHS 
transformation, the distribution of the wealth of entrepreneurial households is more broadly 
dispersed but with relatively fewer households in the lower levels  of wealth and more in the  
higher levels of wealth. While no marked differences in the distributions are apparent, a 
significant horizontal gap may exist between given quantiles of the two distributions and 
therefore a significant difference in the wealth of the households at such quantiles.  
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Figure 3: The Distribution of Household Wealth by Entrepreneurial Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the same time, while it is possible to estimate more robust standard errors by 
employing cluster bootstrapping, this option is not allowed alongside weights. More correct 
standard errors may therefore be obtained at the expense of biased point estimates. To 
evaluate the differences, we compared the weighted and unweighted results including those 
that employed clustered bootstrapping with 50 replications and 1000 replications. Although 
there were minor differences in the point estimates for the median regression, correcting 
standard errors through clustered bootstrapping did not provide notable gains in precision. 
Furthermore, the clustered bootstrapping could not be implemented consistently across all 
quantiles. This is perhaps because in the random resampling with replacement that 
bootstrapping undertakes, certain clusters, which correspond to postcode sectors and 
postcodes are heavily associated with wealth, could not be included in the analysis at upper or 
lower quantiles of wealth if no observations within those clusters could be included. 
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Table A3 presents estimates of the weighted and unweighted coefficients of the 
different correlates of household wealth at different quantiles of wealth. In general, older 
HRPs are wealthier. However, at higher quantiles of wealth, the effect of age on household 
wealth gradually diminishes. Female HRP households are also found to generally have lower 
wealth compared to male HRPs although no effect is detected at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Having a degree as opposed to no qualifications has a highly significant effect across the 
entire distribution of wealth albeit slightly lower at higher levels of wealth. When it comes to 
industry, it generally does not matter which sector the HRP works in for both the poorest and 
the richest households. However, HRPs in the hospitality sector are relatively poorer 
compared to those in agriculture, while those in ICT, finance and public administration, 
education and health appear to be comparatively better off especially between the median 
level and the 90th percentile. The health of the HRP is also estimated to be an important 
determinant of household wealth. HRPs suffering from a long-term illness are generally 
associated with lower household wealth compared to those who have never had a long-term 
illness with effects greater as one approaches both tails. However, for those that previously 
had a long-term illness but have since recovered, there are generally no significant wealth 
differences across the quantiles. 
The results also suggest some interesting ethnicity and immigration effects in 
household wealth. Compared to White British HRPs, White other, Black African, Other 
Asian and mixed-race HRPs are generally worse off especially between the 10th and the 75th 
percentile. With the White other and Black Africans, there is perhaps a story of recent 
migrants not having established themselves in the UK enough to accumulate wealth at 
comparable rates. There may also be effects related to immigrant households remitting 
money back to their countries of origin (Dustmann and Mestres, 2010) and perhaps also the 
µpermanence of temporary migration¶ (Tsuda, 1999) where immigrant households expecting 
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to go back home µone day soon¶ do not take up mortgages, for example. Country of origin 
itself is an important correlate of household wealth. Estimates suggest that although the effect 
is progressively lower with higher wealth, non-British HRPs born in other Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the US) are generally richer than the 
British. In contrast, HRPs born elsewhere in Europe, commonwealth countries or the rest of 
the world are generally poorer than their British counterparts. Further ethnicity and cultural 
effects are also captured by religion. While differences between practising Christian and non-
practising Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Hindu/Sikh households are largely insignificant, 
evidence suggests that households that practice Buddhism, other religions or profess no 
religion at all have significantly lower wealth than practising Christians at the lower to upper 
middle wealth levels.  
Having received lump-sums in the form of money gifts, redundancy, insurance or 
compensation claims payments, or gambling windfalls is also a significant factor. As one 
would expect, receiving inheritance is strongly associated with higher household wealth. 
However, inheritance is not significant at the 99th percentile suggesting that for the very 
wealthy in society, inheritance is statistically inconsequential to their overall wealth. Besides 
property, money and other physical goods, it would appear that non-material (e.g. cultural) 
inheritance matters too. From the median level upwards, the educational qualifications of the 
+53¶V IDWKHU KDYH D YHU\ strong relationship with household wealth. More importantly, 
however, across the whole wealth spectrum, HRPs that did not have a father or step-father 
while growing up have significantly less wealth than HRPs whose (step)father was university 
educated. &XULRXVO\PRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQLVRQO\statistically significant at the lower echelons 
of household wealth and largely affects HRPs who had no mother growing up. Other 
significant family background variables include number of siblings, and the tenure of 
DFFRPPRGDWLRQWKH+53¶VIDPLO\of origin had when the HRP was adolescent. HRPs from a 
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lone child background are found to be richer at all quantiles of wealth, especially as 
compared to HRPs with 5-9 siblings. HRPs whose family lived in rented accommodation, 
free housing, foster homes, institutional or other accommodation as opposed to their own 
homes are relatively poorer. 
Present household characteristics are also significant correlates of household wealth. 
Compared to single households, lone parent are less wealthy while couples (with and without 
children) and multiple occupancy households richer. Indeed, having multiple persons in work 
is strongly associated with wealth, albeit up to the 75th percentile.  By the same token, the 
health of other householders is a significant determinant of household wealth. Households 
with at least one person suffering a long-term illness are generally less wealthy with greater 
effects on the wealth of poorer households. Nevertheless, additional non-HRP human capital, 
measured as total number of years of schooling of other householders, is not significant 
except at the 95th percentile.   
In terms of the broader context of the household, our estimates suggest that rural 
households are generally richer than urban households. Regional effects were also detected 
with households in London and the South East significantly richer than those in Scotland ± an 
effect that was not detected among other regions. Indeed, there is evidence of widening 
divergence between households in London and the South East and those in the corresponding 
wealth quantiles in Scotland, i.e. the gap between the wealthiest households in Scotland and 
the wealthiest in London and the South East is greater than that between households at lower 
quantiles in the respective regions. Weighted estimates however suggest that households at 
the 1st percentile in the East of England, East Midlands and the North West have less wealth 
than their Scottish peers. Our estimates also indicate that British households sustained modest 
losses in wealth in 2009 and 2010 compared to 2008 due to certain year specific factors. 
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Accounting for the HRP, household and contextual factors noted above, conditional 
quantile regressions suggest that the effect of entrepreneurship on household wealth is highly 
heterogeneous with varying impacts at different parts of the wealth distribution. As Table 7 
shows, assuming that the 1st percentile of wealth conditional on the covariates discussed 
above corresponds to the unconditional one, the weighted quantile regression estimates the 
marginal effect of entrepreneurship to household wealth is a reduction of about £3,000. In 
contrast, at the 90th percentile, entrepreneurship is estimated to increase household wealth by 
around 7%.2  
As entrepreneurship is likely endogenous in household wealth, the estimated effects 
are potentially biased. Conversely, WKHHQWUHSUHQHXULDOVWDWXVRIWKH+53¶VSDUHQWVis arguably 
exogenous. Further, having controlled for inheritance, which includes the inheritance of a 
businessWKHHQWUHSUHQHXULDOVWDWXVRIWKH+53V¶SDUHQWVVKRXOGQRWLPSDFWKRXVHKROGZHDOWK. 
However, weighted estimates indicate that at the 1st SHUFHQWLOH KRXVHKROGV ZKRVH +53¶V
father was an entrepreneur are about £5,000 poorer. At the opposite end, having had 
entrepreneurial parents adds 17% to household wealth at the 95th percentile and 35% at the 
99th percentile of the wealth distribution. For richer households with entrepreneurial fathers, 
but not necessarily entrepreneurs themselves, having shares in their (even still living) IDWKHUV¶
businesses will leave these HRPs as shareholders without a directorship role in such 
businesses. These shares may be highly valuable, but they may not count as lump-sum gifts 
since only goods and cash gifts received in the two years preceding the survey were observed. 
Still, it may be the case that the rich children of entrepreneurs acquired certain behaviours 
and attitudes, such as saving, even where they themselves pursued alternative employment. 
Notably, these effects are only observed in the weighted estimates that may more or less 
approximate the effects at the level of the sub-population of working households. 
                                                 
2 Recall that with our IHS transformed data estimated coefficients are approximately linear at low levels and 
approximately logarithmic at higher levels (Pence, 2006). Thus, with an assumed 1st percentile value of around 
£0, the estimated marginal effect is -.323 which corresponds to £3230. 
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Table 7: Quantile Regression Estimates (IHS Wealth)  
 
 1st Percentile 10th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99h Percentile 
VARIABLES Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted 
                 
Entrepreneurial 
household  
-0.323** -0.414 -0.086 -0.054 0.020 0.020 -0.033 0.005 -0.028 0.028 0.069*** 0.089** 0.073* 0.081 0.129* 0.183 
(0 = otherwise) (0.152) (0.319) (0.056) (0.070) (0.050) (0.047) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.024) (0.038) (0.042) (0.056) (0.073) (0.115) 
HRP father 
entrepreneur  
-0.537*** -0.552 0.027 0.028 -0.008 0.048 -0.014 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.062 0.063 0.157** 0.119** 0.299*** 0.141 
(0 = otherwise) (0.189) (0.339) (0.059) (0.075) (0.048) (0.050) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.064) (0.060) (0.082) (0.122) 
HRP mother 
entrepreneur  
-0.605* 0.636 0.056 0.067 0.081 0.015 0.122 0.071 0.137*** 0.111* 0.037 0.127** 0.108 0.126 0.111 0.307 
(0 = otherwise) (0.325) (0.532) (0.083) (0.117) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) (0.055) (0.049) (0.057) (0.038) (0.063) (0.110) (0.094) (0.236) (0.192) 
HRP age (yrs) 0.329*** 0.292*** 0.213*** 0.227*** 0.208*** 0.223*** 0.210*** 0.214*** 0.230*** 0.223*** 0.211*** 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.135*** 0.180*** 
 (0.051) (0.104) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.037) 
HRP age squared -0.003*** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HRP Female (0 = Male) -0.196 -0.232 -0.289*** -0.290*** -0.141*** -0.135*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.110*** -0.147*** -0.110*** -0.127*** -0.106** -0.007 -0.073 
 (0.134) (0.269) (0.041) (0.059) (0.038) (0.040) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.048) (0.088) (0.097) 
HRP Qualification; 
0=No Quals 
                
HRP other 
qualifications 
0.313 0.411 0.300*** 0.439*** 0.368*** 0.497*** 0.296*** 0.322*** 0.264*** 0.283*** 0.180*** 0.233*** 0.203*** 0.252*** -0.164 -0.267* 
 (0.231) (0.433) (0.100) (0.095) (0.074) (0.064) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.043) (0.052) (0.041) (0.077) (0.186) (0.156) 
HRP Degree 
qualifications 
1.195*** 1.301*** 0.914*** 1.047*** 0.902*** 1.052*** 0.733*** 0.776*** 0.653*** 0.674*** 0.549*** 0.620*** 0.611*** 0.654*** 0.413** 0.218 
 (0.263) (0.477) (0.105) (0.105) (0.078) (0.071) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.057) (0.050) (0.084) (0.198) (0.172) 
                 
Observations 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present household and contextual factors included in the regression including industry, health, ethnicity, country of 
ELUWKUHOLJLRQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQQXPEHURIVLEOLQJVIDPLO\EDFNJURXQGKRPHWHQXUHSUHVHQWKRXVHKROGW\SHKealth of other householders, human capital of other householders, number of householders 
presently working, rural/urban, region and year.See Table A3 for the full set of results. 
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4.2.2 Unconditional quantile regression analysis 
A key shortcoming of the standard quantile regression method is that the estimated 
effect at a given quantile pertains to an analysis of a distribution that is conditional on the 
included covariates, i.e. assuming the covariates take given values. While the conditioning is 
crucial in the more analytical understanding of the various effects, the (residual) distributions 
upon which the quantile analysis is undertaken will often not correspond to the unconditional 
distribution observed in the data. This makes the interpretation of the quantile regression 
coefficients in a way that is relevant for policy and practice very difficult (Firpo, 2007; Firpo 
et al., 2009). Towards estimating the various effects at the observed sample or population 
quantiles, Firpo (2007) proposed an unconditional quantile treatment effects estimator. To 
increase the efficiency of the model and still account for the effect of covariates, rather than 
conditioning the estimates on the included covariates being held constant at some value, 
control variables are included but are employed in a first stage estimation and then integrated 
out. The estimated unconditional coefficients therefore approximate the  effects remaining in 
the distribution of the outcome variable that may be attributed to the independent variable in 
question  (Frölich and Melly, 2010).  
Assuming that entrepreneurship is not endogenous in wealth, Table 8 shows that there 
are no statistically significant differences between the wealth of entrepreneurial households 
and that of employee households at the different unconditional quantiles. However, Table 9 
shows that the unconditional treatment effects model is able to detect some direct exogenous 
effects of entrHSUHQHXULDO SDUHQWV RQ WKHLU FKLOGUHQ¶V (HRPs) household wealth. Although 
having a direct effect weakens the ability RI +53V¶ paternal entrepreneurship status to 
recover the causal effects of entrepreneurship on household wealth, it is not highly significant 
and may therefore still be useful. 
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Table 8: Unconditional Quantile Treatment Estimates: Assuming Exogenous 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Dependent variable is total household wealth; Independent 
(treatment) variable is entrepreneurship (i.e. HRP entrepreneur vs. 
employee) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IHS LOG CURT Levels 
     
1st Percentile  -0.471 -6.036 -1.109 -0.484 
 (1.508) (4.749) (1.345) (11.129) 
10th Percentile  0.201 0.206 0.114 0.942 
 (0.257) (0.264) (0.147) (1.254) 
25th Percentile 0.030 0.030 0.024 0.421 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.085) (1.558) 
Median 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.558 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (1.951) 
75th Percentile 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.220 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (2.863) 
90th Percentile 0.080 0.080 0.135 10.486 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.097) (7.651) 
95th Percentile 0.064 0.064 0.119 11.239 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.134) (13.099) 
99th Percentile 0.054 0.054 0.130 20.396 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.265) (42.002) 
     
Observations 9,553 9,553 9,553 9,553 
Cluster bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present 
household and contextual factors included in the regression including industry, 
health, ethnicity, country oI ELUWK UHOLJLRQ IDWKHU DQG PRWKHU¶V HGXFDWLRQ
number of siblings, family back ground home tenure, present household type, 
health of other householders, human capital of other householders, number of 
householders presently working, rural/urban, region and year. IHS, LOG and 
CURT refer to Inverse Hyperbolic Sine, log and cuberoot transformed wealth. 
/HYHOVLVUDZZHDOWKLQ¶V 
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Table 9: Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effects of Entrepreneurial Parents 
 
Dependent variable is total household wealth; Independent 
(treatment) variable is  HRP father being an entrepreneur 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IHS LOG CURT Levels 
     
1st Percentile  -0.406 -6.424 -1.100 -0.413 
 (0.323) (4.671) (0.735) (0.335) 
10th Percentile  -0.091 -0.094 -0.049 -0.372 
 (0.164) (0.171) (0.088) (0.638) 
25th Percentile 0.043 0.043 0.035 0.607 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.070) (1.242) 
Median 0.103* 0.103* 0.113* 3.672* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (1.957) 
75th Percentile 0.057 0.057 0.080 4.201 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.065) (3.481) 
90th Percentile 0.129** 0.129** 0.220** 17.254** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.101) (8.043) 
95th Percentile 0.129* 0.129* 0.243* 23.445* 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.131) (12.852) 
99th Percentile 0.239* 0.239* 0.585* 95.050 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.355) (61.780) 
     
Observations 9,553 9,553 9,553 9,553 
Cluster bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present 
household and contextual factors included in the regression including industry, 
KHDOWK HWKQLFLW\ FRXQWU\ RI ELUWK UHOLJLRQ IDWKHU DQG PRWKHU¶V HGXFDWLRQ
number of siblings, family back ground home tenure, present household type, 
health of other householders, human capital of other householders, number of 
householders presently working, rural/urban, region and year. IHS, LOG and 
CURT refer to Inverse Hyperbolic Sine, log and cuberoot transformed wealth. 
LeYHOVLVUDZZHDOWKLQ¶V 
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8VLQJ +53V¶ paternal HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VWDWXV WR LQVWUXPHQW IRU WKH +53¶V RZQ
entrepreneurial status, Table 10 reports the estimates of the unconditional endogenous 
quantile treatment effects, the estimator proposed by Frölich & Melly (2008; 2010). This 
model estimates that entrepreneurship has no effect on lower wealth households but 
substantially  increases household wealth for households that are already well off. For 
households at the median level of wealth, all estimates suggest that entrepreneurship could 
more than double household wealth (an increase of around £380,000 on the £340,000 
unweighted median wealth). The impact of entrepreneurship on household wealth is 
seemingly even greater at higher levels of household wealth. Estimates of IHS and log 
transformed wealth suggests that entrepreneurship could triple household wealth for 
households at the 75th percentile; an increase of 300%, 600% and 700% is estimated at the 
90th, 95th and 99th percentiles respectively.  
Importantly, with relatively large standard errors, the precision of the estimates is 
rather poor. Further,  the estimates do not take  the sampling weights into account and while  
only financial wealth in shareholding was used in the design stage, in every primary sampling 
unit (PSU) relatively wealthier households (those above the 90th percentile of financial 
wealth in such a PSU) were oversampled at a rate of 3 times that of other households (ONS, 
2012). Hence, the unweighted sample is highly skewed. For example, for the sub-sample of 
working-age employees and entrepreneurs, the weighted 99th percentile is about £3 Million 
(£2.99 Million for all households) while the unweighted one is £3.7 Million (£3.9M for full 
sample). The weighted and unweighted medians are £270,000 and £340,000 respectively.  
This means that while the analysis of unweighted data is highly instructive, it is important to 
recognise that wealth quantiles in the unweighted sample are higher than those expected in 
the population. In line Table A3, assuming that point estimates are broadly similar between 
the weighted and unweighted data, significant effects found at the median level in the sample 
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would correspond to above-median households in the population. The implication is that 
entrepreneurship may only be interpreted to have an effect on the wealth of above-median 
households in the population.  
Nevertheless, as recent research has also observed (Coad et al., 2014), the efficacy of 
SDUHQW¶V HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS Vtatus as an instrument for entrepreneurship may itself be 
questioned. Indeed, while not strongly significant, parental entrepreneurship was found to 
instrument for itself and may not efficiently recover the causal effects of +53V¶
entrepreneurship on household wealth.  The presence of defiers may also not be ruled out 
completely and only a few compliers may be observed after all. In the present case, the 
proportion of compliers was 6%. These estimates should therefore be interpreted with 
caution.  
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Table 10: Causal Effect of Entrepreneurship on Household Wealth: Unconditional 
Endogenous Quantile Treatment Estimates 
Dependent variable is total household wealth; Independent (treatment) 
variable is instrumented entrepreneurship (i.e. HRP entrepreneur 
instrumented by HRP father is entrepreneur) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IHS Log Curt Levels 
     
1st Percentile  1.725 1.754 1.210 17.103* 
 (1.467) (2.705) (1.039) (10.333) 
10th Percentile  0.889 0.891 0.769 15.836 
 (1.002) (1.102) (0.646) (10.080) 
25th Percentile 0.880 0.881 0.850 21.822* 
 (0.693) (0.707) (0.546) (12.828) 
Median 0.916** 0.917** 1.049** 37.995** 
 (0.458) (0.459) (0.469) (16.274) 
75th Percentile 1.106** 1.106** 1.413* 64.445 
 (0.551) (0.551) (0.744) (46.393) 
90th Percentile 1.486** 1.487** 2.246** 146.994 
 (0.628) (0.628) (1.003) (98.517) 
95th Percentile 1.950*** 1.950*** 3.389** 305.819* 
 (0.740) (0.741) (1.335) (163.589) 
99th Percentile 2.161*** 2.161*** 4.364*** 543.084** 
 (0.758) (0.758) (1.445) (226.536) 
     
Observations 9,549 9,549 9,549 9,549 
Cluster bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present household and contextual factors included in 
WKHUHJUHVVLRQLQFOXGLQJLQGXVWU\KHDOWKHWKQLFLW\FRXQWU\RIELUWKUHOLJLRQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHU¶V
education, number of siblings, family back ground home tenure, present household type, health of 
other householders, human capital of other householders, number of householders presently 
working, rural/urban, region and year.; IHS, LOG and CURT refer to Inverse Hyperbolic Sine, log 
and cuberoot transformed wealth. LHYHOVLVUDZZHDOWKLQ¶V 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This study attempted to address two issues central to understanding the financial 
rewards of entrepreneurship. Firstly, we examined the size, composition and distribution of 
wealth owned by entrepreneurs relative to the wealth of other groups of economically active 
or economically inactive groups. Secondly, we explored whether a causal relationship could 
be established to understand whether the apparent wealth of entrepreneurs was directly 
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attributable to entrepreneurial activities rather than other factors.  In so doing, we provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the financial rewards of entrepreneurship, contributing new 
insights that move the field beyond the entrepreneurial incomes puzzle that has preoccupied 
scholars to date.  
It is clear from this study that entrepreneurial households own disproportionately 
more wealth than other households. Between them, the two groups of entrepreneurs, self-
employed with no employees and business owners with employees, comprise 8% of 
households, yet own 15% of household property wealthy, 13% of net financial wealth and 
12% of physical wealth including 15% of the value of household motor vehicles and almost 
30% of all household valuables and collectables. The wealth of entrepreneurs with employees 
is greater than the wealth of the self-employed with no employees. While only 2% of 
households have HRPs who are owner-managers of small businesses with employees, 
collectively these households own 4% of total household wealth. The self-employed with no 
employees account for 6% of households, but own a slightly higher proportion (7%) of total 
household wealth. This finding contradicts some prior studies that have measured 
entrepreneurial earnings using incomes data (Blanchflower, 2004; Shane, 2008), which have 
argued that entrepreneurship does not pay. Rather, entrepreneurial households that are 
IUHTXHQWO\DUJXHGWREHµLQFRPHSRRU¶FDQLQVWHDGEHshown to hold a variety of assets that 
can be used to supplement household budgets over time, smoothing consumption for the 
household and providing a credit cushion for the business.  
It is apparent that entrepreneurial households are relatively overrepresented in the 
higher echelons of wealth and there are also indications that entrepreneurship could be, to 
some extent responsible, for the higher levels of wealth observed. However, there is a great 
diversity in the wealth owned by entrepreneurial households, and it is important not to over-
hype the fortunes that may be expected from entrepreneurship. Indeed, differences between 
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entrepreneurial households and employee households over the entire distribution of wealth 
are small. The extent to which differences in wealth observed among entrepreneurial 
households can be directly attributed to entrepreneurship are more difficult to demonstrate. 
Among the methodological difficulties encountered, finding good instruments remains a huge 
challenge and estimation tools that take into account issues such as survey data sampling 
weights, selectivity, endogeneity, and heterogeneity have yet to be developed, although 
)U|OLFKDQG0HOO\¶VLQVWUXPHQWDOYDULDEOHTXDQWLOHWUHDWPHQWHIIHFWV,947(67$7$
module  is an important step in this direction. Nevertheless, the present first approximations 
suggest that entrepreneurship may have a cumulative effect on household wealth; 
entrepreneurship makes wealthy households wealthier but has no effect on the wealth of 
households below the median level. In this light, traditional views of entrepreneurship as a 
middle class occupation continue to have salience, while no evidence was found to show that 
entrepreneurship is an effective vehicle to enhance social mobility among poorer households. 
However, while the Wealth & Assets Survey provides powerful insights, it is relatively new 
and further waves will provide a robust panel dataset tracking the fortunes of individuals and 
households over time, providing more insights into the effects of entrepreneurship on socio-
economic mobility.  
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7 Appendices 
 
Table A1: OLS Regression: IHS of Wealth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Unweighted Weighted Clustered Cluster_nowgt ihswealthw2 workinghrpw2 
Entrepreneurial household  0.003 -0.029 -0.029 0.003 -0.008  
(0 = otherwise) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044) (0.034) (0.040)  
HRP father entrepreneur  0.018 -0.002 -0.002 0.018 0.017  
(0 = otherwise) (0.035) (0.048) (0.049) (0.037) (0.046)  
HRP mother entrepreneur  0.063 0.041 0.041 0.063 0.038  
(0 = otherwise) (0.055) (0.088) (0.089) (0.061) (0.078)  
HRP age (yrs) 0.214*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.214*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
HRP age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HRP Female (0 = Male) -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.034 -0.114*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) (0.043) 
HRP Qualification; 0=No Quals       
HRP other qualifications 0.349*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.349*** -0.048 0.615*** 
 (0.045) (0.058) (0.058) (0.049) (0.062) (0.047) 
HRP Degree qualifications 0.851*** 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.851*** 0.312*** 0.972*** 
 (0.049) (0.064) (0.065) (0.054) (0.070) (0.057) 
Observations 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 11,599 11,599 
R-squared 0.454 0.442 0.442 0.454   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present household and contextual factors included in the 
UHJUHVVLRQLQFOXGLQJLQGXVWU\KHDOWKHWKQLFLW\FRXQWU\RIELUWKUHOLJLRQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQQXPEHURIVLEOLQgs, family back ground home tenure, 
present household type, health of other householders, human capital of other householders, number of householders presently working, rural/urban, region and 
year. 
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Table A2: Average Treatment Effects  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Outcome Treatment Outcome Treatment Outcome Treatment 
VARIABLES ihswealthw2 entrhholdw2 lnwealthw2 entrhholdw2 curtwealthw2 entrhholdw2 
Entrepreneurial household  0.078  0.180  0.082  
(0 = otherwise) (0.126)  (0.117)  (0.091)  
HRP father entrepreneur   0.302***  0.306***  0.303*** 
(0 = otherwise)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.057) 
HRP age (yrs) 0.209*** 0.052*** 0.200*** 0.047** 0.165*** 0.052*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
HRP age squared -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HRP Female (0 = Male) -0.130*** -0.349*** -0.125*** -0.344*** -0.130*** -0.349*** 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.033) (0.055) (0.032) (0.055) 
HRP Qualification; 0=No Quals       
HRP other qualifications 0.291*** -0.126* 0.355*** -0.112 0.246*** -0.125* 
 (0.058) (0.075) (0.059) (0.075) (0.048) (0.075) 
HRP Degree qualifications 0.780*** -0.178** 0.852*** -0.160* 0.782*** -0.177** 
 (0.064) (0.084) (0.064) (0.085) (0.056) (0.084) 
       
Observations 9,064 9,064 8,973 8,973 9,064 9,064 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other personal, family background, present household and contextual factors included in the regression including industry, health, 
ethnicity, country of birth, UHOLJLRQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQQXPEHURIVLEOLQJVIDPLO\EDFNJURXQGKRPHWHQXUHSUHVHQWKRXVHKROGW\SHKHDOWKRf other householders, human capital of other 
householders, number of householders presently working, rural/urban, region and year. 
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Table A3: Quantile Regression Estimates (IHS Wealth)  
 
 1st Percentile 10th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99h Percentile 
VARIABLES Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted 
                 
Entrepreneurial 
household  
-0.323** -0.414 -0.086 -0.054 0.020 0.020 -0.033 0.005 -0.028 0.028 0.069*** 0.089** 0.073* 0.081 0.129* 0.183 
(0 = otherwise) (0.152) (0.319) (0.056) (0.070) (0.050) (0.047) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.024) (0.038) (0.042) (0.056) (0.073) (0.115) 
HRP father 
entrepreneur  
-0.537*** -0.552 0.027 0.028 -0.008 0.048 -0.014 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.062 0.063 0.157** 0.119** 0.299*** 0.141 
(0 = otherwise) (0.189) (0.339) (0.059) (0.075) (0.048) (0.050) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.064) (0.060) (0.082) (0.122) 
HRP mother 
entrepreneur  
-0.605* 0.636 0.056 0.067 0.081 0.015 0.122 0.071 0.137*** 0.111* 0.037 0.127** 0.108 0.126 0.111 0.307 
(0 = otherwise) (0.325) (0.532) (0.083) (0.117) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) (0.055) (0.049) (0.057) (0.038) (0.063) (0.110) (0.094) (0.236) (0.192) 
HRP age (yrs) 0.329*** 0.292*** 0.213*** 0.227*** 0.208*** 0.223*** 0.210*** 0.214*** 0.230*** 0.223*** 0.211*** 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.135*** 0.180*** 
 (0.051) (0.104) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.037) 
HRP age squared -0.003*** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HRP Female (0 = Male) -0.196 -0.232 -0.289*** -0.290*** -0.141*** -0.135*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.110*** -0.147*** -0.110*** -0.127*** -0.106** -0.007 -0.073 
 (0.134) (0.269) (0.041) (0.059) (0.038) (0.040) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.048) (0.088) (0.097) 
HRP Qualification; 
0=No Quals 
                
HRP other 
qualifications 
0.313 0.411 0.300*** 0.439*** 0.368*** 0.497*** 0.296*** 0.322*** 0.264*** 0.283*** 0.180*** 0.233*** 0.203*** 0.252*** -0.164 -0.267* 
 (0.231) (0.433) (0.100) (0.095) (0.074) (0.064) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.043) (0.052) (0.041) (0.077) (0.186) (0.156) 
HRP Degree 
qualifications 
1.195*** 1.301*** 0.914*** 1.047*** 0.902*** 1.052*** 0.733*** 0.776*** 0.653*** 0.674*** 0.549*** 0.620*** 0.611*** 0.654*** 0.413** 0.218 
 (0.263) (0.477) (0.105) (0.105) (0.078) (0.071) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.057) (0.050) (0.084) (0.198) (0.172) 
HRP Industry; 0 = 
Agri/primary 
                
Manufacturing -0.083 -0.448 0.292*** 0.288 0.125 0.128 0.286 0.280 0.219 0.289 0.393*** 0.368* 0.335** 0.377 0.163 0.185 
 (0.977) (1.699) (0.108) (0.375) (0.116) (0.252) (0.215) (0.175) (0.135) (0.183) (0.090) (0.202) (0.144) (0.301) (0.727) (0.614) 
Utilities 0.758 -0.525 0.509** 0.666 0.347* 0.331 0.429** 0.435** 0.245 0.426** 0.443*** 0.479** 0.281* 0.430 0.203 0.526 
 (1.013) (1.887) (0.207) (0.416) (0.187) (0.280) (0.218) (0.194) (0.165) (0.203) (0.092) (0.225) (0.155) (0.334) (0.752) (0.682) 
Construction -0.572 -0.917 0.152 0.223 0.095 0.108 0.221 0.222 0.066 0.114 0.274*** 0.204 0.212 0.277 0.190 0.110 
 (0.982) (1.709) (0.113) (0.377) (0.119) (0.253) (0.216) (0.176) (0.136) (0.184) (0.088) (0.203) (0.150) (0.303) (0.728) (0.618) 
Retails, repairs and 
storage 
-0.447 -0.950 0.061 0.151 -0.048 -0.034 0.165 0.141 0.043 0.126 0.244*** 0.192 0.165 0.220 0.145 -0.005 
 (0.972) (1.694) (0.122) (0.373) (0.120) (0.251) (0.215) (0.174) (0.135) (0.182) (0.089) (0.202) (0.143) (0.300) (0.728) (0.612) 
Hospitality -1.672* -2.026 -0.782*** -0.438 -0.638*** -0.531** -0.172 -0.202 -0.248* -0.140 -0.103 -0.000 -0.154 0.089 -0.202 -0.180 
 (1.000) (1.817) (0.146) (0.400) (0.187) (0.269) (0.235) (0.187) (0.137) (0.195) (0.171) (0.216) (0.199) (0.322) (0.773) (0.656) 
ICT -0.378 -0.482 0.497*** 0.525 0.396*** 0.333 0.511** 0.455** 0.459*** 0.481** 0.501*** 0.432** 0.398*** 0.409 0.222 0.324 
 (1.028) (1.743) (0.117) (0.384) (0.118) (0.258) (0.222) (0.179) (0.141) (0.187) (0.089) (0.207) (0.153) (0.309) (0.731) (0.630) 
Finance and other prof 
servces 
-0.333 -0.504 0.345*** 0.343 0.163 0.196 0.411* 0.389** 0.362*** 0.421** 0.581*** 0.536*** 0.491*** 0.562* 0.305 0.240 
 (0.961) (1.696) (0.106) (0.374) (0.119) (0.251) (0.214) (0.175) (0.136) (0.182) (0.090) (0.202) (0.144) (0.300) (0.727) (0.613) 
Govt, education and 
health 
0.090 -0.222 0.656*** 0.659* 0.389*** 0.340 0.527** 0.482*** 0.401*** 0.421** 0.542*** 0.457** 0.451*** 0.477 0.353 0.307 
 (0.961) (1.693) (0.103) (0.373) (0.118) (0.251) (0.214) (0.174) (0.133) (0.182) (0.089) (0.202) (0.144) (0.300) (0.728) (0.612) 
Arts and entertainment -0.556 -0.443 0.579*** 0.479 0.297** 0.140 0.408* 0.352* 0.280* 0.349* 0.402*** 0.294 0.232 0.343 0.304 0.509 
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 (0.982) (1.827) (0.213) (0.403) (0.131) (0.271) (0.237) (0.188) (0.164) (0.196) (0.090) (0.217) (0.171) (0.324) (0.800) (0.660) 
Other services -1.114 -2.001 0.071 0.160 -0.205 -0.214 0.194 0.115 0.115 0.097 0.335** 0.202 0.142 0.293 -0.088 -0.244 
 (0.992) (1.806) (0.274) (0.398) (0.171) (0.268) (0.241) (0.186) (0.150) (0.194) (0.157) (0.215) (0.152) (0.320) (0.771) (0.652) 
Long-term illness; 0 = 
Never 
                
Previously long-ill 0.738 0.779 -0.056 -0.097 -0.050 0.012 -0.082 -0.137* -0.148** -0.139 -0.092* -0.130 -0.156*** -0.016 0.164 0.492* 
 (0.793) (0.798) (0.118) (0.176) (0.072) (0.118) (0.072) (0.082) (0.063) (0.086) (0.048) (0.095) (0.051) (0.141) (0.133) (0.288) 
Presently long-ill -0.313* -0.106 -0.160*** -0.192*** -0.118*** -0.129*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.038 -0.051* -0.082*** -0.115*** -0.096*** -0.111** -0.245*** -0.129 
 (0.178) (0.280) (0.047) (0.062) (0.032) (0.042) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.020) (0.033) (0.026) (0.050) (0.061) (0.101) 
HRP ethnicity; 0 = 
White British 
                
White other -1.020** -1.498* -0.602*** -0.441** -0.361*** -0.375*** -0.269** -0.256*** -0.227** -0.135 0.065 -0.006 0.027 -0.017 -0.082 0.133 
 (0.472) (0.779) (0.112) (0.172) (0.120) (0.116) (0.105) (0.080) (0.106) (0.084) (0.081) (0.093) (0.068) (0.138) (0.195) (0.281) 
Mixed -0.166 0.115 -0.233 -0.369 -0.448*** -0.398** -0.289** -0.340*** -0.170 -0.285** -0.420*** -0.362** -0.410*** -0.258 -0.647** -0.777* 
 (1.113) (1.242) (0.207) (0.274) (0.082) (0.184) (0.118) (0.128) (0.144) (0.133) (0.054) (0.148) (0.143) (0.220) (0.276) (0.449) 
Indian -1.333 0.661 -0.477** -0.422 0.172 0.166 0.124 0.168 0.231 0.226 0.085 0.066 -0.010 0.095 -0.225 -0.632 
 (2.384) (1.536) (0.192) (0.338) (0.331) (0.228) (0.134) (0.158) (0.216) (0.165) (0.302) (0.183) (0.329) (0.272) (1.547) (0.555) 
Pakistani 0.984 1.393 -0.212 0.025 -0.419 0.223 -0.133 0.006 -0.161 -0.158 -0.330 -0.076 -0.932*** -0.817** -1.510 -0.635 
 (1.787) (1.892) (0.490) (0.417) (0.303) (0.281) (0.141) (0.195) (0.196) (0.203) (0.502) (0.225) (0.219) (0.335) (1.268) (0.684) 
Bangladeshi 1.048 2.915 1.078 0.794 0.465 0.336 -0.259 0.354 -0.055 -0.078 0.172 0.378 -0.522 0.078 -0.690 -0.062 
 (2.888) (2.950) (1.029) (0.650) (0.530) (0.437) (0.219) (0.304) (0.218) (0.317) (2.091) (0.351) (0.377) (0.523) (1.362) (1.066) 
Other Asian -0.174 0.456 -1.442*** -1.417*** -0.327 -0.728*** -0.364*** -0.330** 0.030 -0.078 -0.220 0.048 -0.184 -0.046 0.245 0.106 
 (1.239) (1.533) (0.430) (0.338) (0.379) (0.227) (0.113) (0.158) (0.185) (0.165) (0.243) (0.183) (0.175) (0.272) (1.582) (0.554) 
Black Caribbean -1.499 -3.025*** -0.270** -0.302 -0.075 -0.367** -0.151 -0.296*** -0.124 -0.288** -0.116** -0.188 -0.099 -0.227 -0.354 -0.739* 
 (1.569) (1.097) (0.135) (0.242) (0.124) (0.163) (0.134) (0.113) (0.123) (0.118) (0.051) (0.131) (0.181) (0.194) (0.217) (0.396) 
Black African -1.816* -2.054 -1.069* -1.151*** -0.692*** -0.996*** -0.844*** -0.911*** -0.830*** -0.810*** -0.512 -0.554*** -0.307 0.011 0.228 0.280 
 (1.038) (1.310) (0.620) (0.289) (0.216) (0.194) (0.208) (0.135) (0.086) (0.141) (0.480) (0.156) (0.739) (0.232) (0.493) (0.473) 
Other black -0.291 0.722 -1.661 -0.595 -1.931 -1.557** -1.639 -1.923*** -0.560 -0.762* 0.767 0.351 0.620 0.311 -0.125 -0.703 
 (5.688) (4.166) (0.000) (0.918) (1.240) (0.618) (1.224) (0.429) (5.221) (0.448) (1.491) (0.496) (0.864) (0.738) (0.000) (1.505) 
Chinese 1.381 0.910 0.895*** 0.625 1.085*** 0.198 0.555 0.677*** 0.380** 0.562** 0.333 0.353 0.028 0.672* 0.613 0.626 
 (4.148) (2.289) (0.249) (0.504) (0.314) (0.339) (0.549) (0.236) (0.169) (0.246) (0.618) (0.272) (0.281) (0.405) (0.701) (0.827) 
Other ethnicity -0.224 -0.041 -0.511 -0.546 -0.121 -0.390* -0.294** -0.286* -0.390 -0.302* -0.338** -0.261 -0.231* -0.182 -0.722 0.629 
 (0.944) (1.532) (0.474) (0.338) (0.300) (0.227) (0.122) (0.158) (0.756) (0.165) (0.147) (0.182) (0.133) (0.271) (0.918) (0.553) 
HRP Country of birth; 0 
= UK 
                
Other Anglo-saxon 
countries 
1.173** 0.815 0.606*** 0.326 0.461*** 0.356** 0.318*** 0.186* 0.410*** 0.305*** 0.240*** 0.190 0.076 0.169 0.345 0.269 
 (0.583) (0.984) (0.085) (0.217) (0.053) (0.146) (0.123) (0.101) (0.050) (0.106) (0.063) (0.117) (0.100) (0.174) (0.333) (0.355) 
Europe -0.417 -0.501 -0.479*** -0.689*** -0.779*** -0.579*** -0.550*** -0.374*** -0.265** -0.152* -0.192*** -0.107 -0.307*** -0.215 -0.246 -0.610** 
 (0.411) (0.840) (0.104) (0.185) (0.226) (0.125) (0.114) (0.086) (0.116) (0.090) (0.037) (0.100) (0.119) (0.149) (0.621) (0.304) 
Commonwealth 
countries 
-0.036 -1.109 -0.659*** -0.710*** -0.649*** -0.416*** -0.333*** -0.273*** -0.224** -0.138* -0.134* -0.058 -0.208** -0.160 -0.042 0.033 
 (1.018) (0.765) (0.105) (0.169) (0.110) (0.113) (0.091) (0.079) (0.092) (0.082) (0.071) (0.091) (0.096) (0.135) (0.170) (0.276) 
Rest of the world 0.655 0.098 -0.611*** -0.571*** -0.970*** -0.645*** -0.467*** -0.484*** -0.304* -0.304*** -0.122 -0.253** -0.289*** -0.280* -0.123 -0.226 
 (0.780) (0.898) (0.149) (0.198) (0.202) (0.133) (0.078) (0.092) (0.168) (0.097) (0.080) (0.107) (0.063) (0.159) (0.568) (0.324) 
HRP Religion; 
0=Practising Christian 
                
Non-practising 
Christian 
-0.025 0.171 0.089*** 0.036 0.014 -0.001 0.023 -0.015 0.016 0.008 -0.016 -0.021 0.035 0.001 0.021 -0.048 
 (0.164) (0.281) (0.033) (0.062) (0.036) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.016) (0.033) (0.028) (0.050) (0.060) (0.102) 
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Muslim -0.472 0.224 -0.024 -0.096 0.100 -0.159 -0.098 -0.201 -0.124 -0.144 -0.047 -0.215 0.658*** 0.540** 0.712 0.257 
 (1.617) (1.392) (0.315) (0.307) (0.283) (0.206) (0.105) (0.143) (0.185) (0.150) (0.420) (0.166) (0.169) (0.247) (1.294) (0.503) 
Jewish 1.091** 0.698 -0.012 0.172 0.360 0.307 0.174 0.236 0.243 0.206 0.240* 0.050 0.118 0.015 0.075 -0.101 
 (0.430) (1.398) (0.116) (0.308) (0.359) (0.207) (0.116) (0.144) (0.378) (0.150) (0.141) (0.166) (0.142) (0.248) (1.289) (0.505) 
Hindu/ Sikh 0.529 -1.104 0.378* 0.377 0.125 0.087 -0.151 -0.242 -0.173 -0.279* -0.105 -0.181 0.077 0.082 -0.009 0.504 
 (1.733) (1.513) (0.204) (0.333) (0.319) (0.224) (0.140) (0.156) (0.174) (0.163) (0.301) (0.180) (0.262) (0.268) (1.519) (0.546) 
Buddhist/ Other -1.323* -1.292 -0.302 -0.367 -0.381** -0.286* -0.565*** -0.433*** -0.422*** -0.380*** -0.384 -0.486*** 0.004 -0.210 -0.494 -0.484 
 (0.787) (1.071) (0.451) (0.236) (0.191) (0.159) (0.056) (0.110) (0.120) (0.115) (0.267) (0.127) (0.099) (0.190) (0.312) (0.387) 
No religion -0.379** -0.253 -0.246*** -0.215*** -0.080* -0.113** -0.064* -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.085** -0.141*** -0.118*** -0.013 -0.049 -0.128* -0.201 
 (0.185) (0.346) (0.062) (0.076) (0.042) (0.051) (0.039) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.041) (0.034) (0.061) (0.070) (0.125) 
HRP/Partner received 
inherit 
0.239** 0.418 0.314*** 0.317*** 0.165*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.187*** 0.170*** 0.145*** 0.131*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.140*** 0.053 0.051 
(0=Never) (0.118) (0.266) (0.046) (0.059) (0.030) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.032) (0.029) (0.047) (0.059) (0.096) 
HRP/Partner received 
lumpsm 
-0.090 -0.065 0.213*** 0.142** 0.120*** 0.106** 0.117*** 0.071** 0.084*** 0.043 0.021 0.039 0.033 0.024 0.146** -0.001 
(0=Never) (0.207) (0.285) (0.039) (0.063) (0.038) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.019) (0.034) (0.036) (0.051) (0.064) (0.103) 
HRP father 
qualifications; 0= 
Degree 
                
Further Quals -0.209 0.269 0.074 0.017 0.029 0.051 -0.068 -0.011 -0.072* -0.063 -0.151*** -0.190*** -0.261*** -0.220** -0.323*** -0.451** 
 (0.305) (0.522) (0.079) (0.115) (0.066) (0.077) (0.048) (0.054) (0.042) (0.056) (0.037) (0.062) (0.093) (0.092) (0.119) (0.189) 
Left 17 or 18 -0.622 -0.195 0.035 -0.038 0.071 0.027 -0.051 -0.011 -0.046 -0.021 -0.039 -0.086 -0.109 0.008 -0.058 -0.174 
 (0.400) (0.618) (0.090) (0.136) (0.066) (0.092) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.066) (0.046) (0.074) (0.112) (0.109) (0.325) (0.223) 
Left 15 or 16 -0.275 0.232 0.003 -0.014 -0.041 -0.011 -0.127** -0.090 -0.094** -0.079 -0.159*** -0.214*** -0.244*** -0.210** -0.362*** -0.487** 
 (0.265) (0.530) (0.074) (0.117) (0.068) (0.079) (0.051) (0.055) (0.042) (0.057) (0.038) (0.063) (0.092) (0.094) (0.134) (0.192) 
Left before 15 -0.566** 0.013 -0.045 -0.096 -0.047 -0.048 -0.121** -0.087 -0.138*** -0.124** -0.177*** -0.234*** -0.238** -0.221** -0.349** -0.513*** 
 (0.269) (0.543) (0.078) (0.120) (0.069) (0.081) (0.049) (0.056) (0.043) (0.058) (0.038) (0.065) (0.093) (0.096) (0.136) (0.196) 
Father no school -0.503 0.510 -0.480 0.118 -0.313** -0.100 -0.232** -0.092 -0.106 -0.232* -0.356*** -0.119 -0.197 -0.120 0.251 -0.338 
 (1.242) (1.306) (0.360) (0.288) (0.123) (0.194) (0.100) (0.134) (0.067) (0.140) (0.083) (0.155) (0.227) (0.231) (0.290) (0.472) 
HRP no father growing 
up 
-1.154*** -0.155 -0.224*** -0.264** -0.165** -0.140 -0.211*** -0.167*** -0.189*** -0.169*** -0.181*** -0.211*** -0.249*** -0.216** -0.481*** -0.660*** 
 (0.294) (0.578) (0.077) (0.127) (0.079) (0.086) (0.062) (0.059) (0.052) (0.062) (0.046) (0.069) (0.093) (0.102) (0.133) (0.209) 
HRP mother 
qualifications; 0= 
Degree 
                
Further Quals 1.176** -0.658 0.123 0.132 0.001 -0.013 0.041 -0.004 -0.031 -0.074 0.125** 0.077 0.142* 0.071 0.096 0.118 
 (0.543) (0.637) (0.092) (0.140) (0.095) (0.094) (0.062) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.051) (0.076) (0.081) (0.113) (0.143) (0.230) 
Left 17 or 18 1.372** 0.302 -0.003 0.132 0.027 0.028 0.052 -0.007 0.002 -0.081 0.022 0.077 0.043 0.072 0.125 0.201 
 (0.578) (0.679) (0.095) (0.150) (0.096) (0.101) (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.073) (0.054) (0.081) (0.088) (0.120) (0.178) (0.245) 
Left 15 or 16 1.669*** -0.048 -0.116 -0.022 -0.108 -0.082 -0.019 -0.052 -0.083 -0.180*** 0.035 0.014 0.065 0.032 0.193 0.183 
 (0.545) (0.619) (0.088) (0.137) (0.093) (0.092) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) (0.049) (0.074) (0.074) (0.110) (0.153) (0.224) 
Left before 15 1.534*** -0.247 -0.084 0.013 -0.094 -0.095 -0.035 -0.094 -0.063 -0.172** 0.057 0.014 0.074 0.054 0.150 0.228 
 (0.545) (0.644) (0.093) (0.142) (0.094) (0.095) (0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.049) (0.077) (0.078) (0.114) (0.155) (0.233) 
Mother no school 2.356* 0.400 0.297 0.154 0.321* 0.011 0.194** -0.021 0.099 -0.053 0.154 -0.102 0.186* -0.090 -0.060 0.055 
 (1.233) (1.248) (0.271) (0.275) (0.173) (0.185) (0.080) (0.128) (0.138) (0.134) (0.134) (0.149) (0.113) (0.221) (0.278) (0.451) 
HRP no mother 
growing up 
1.905*** 0.257 -0.368** -0.355* -0.380*** -0.363*** -0.191** -0.192** -0.122 -0.185** -0.010 -0.037 0.088 0.047 0.299 0.389 
 (0.599) (0.824) (0.171) (0.182) (0.141) (0.122) (0.094) (0.085) (0.091) (0.089) (0.079) (0.098) (0.112) (0.146) (0.187) (0.298) 
HRP number of 
siblings; 0 = Lone child 
                
54 
 
 
1-4 siblings -0.065 0.068 -0.008 -0.008 -0.113*** -0.108** -0.046 -0.070** -0.076** -0.077** -0.121*** -0.127*** -0.089** -0.126** -0.088 -0.045 
 (0.180) (0.331) (0.054) (0.073) (0.031) (0.049) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) (0.025) (0.039) (0.045) (0.059) (0.077) (0.120) 
5-9 siblings -1.365*** -1.404** -0.377*** -0.499*** -0.456*** -0.450*** -0.357*** -0.338*** -0.258*** -0.287*** -0.329*** -0.272*** -0.262*** -0.262*** -0.518*** -0.526*** 
 (0.503) (0.545) (0.064) (0.120) (0.059) (0.081) (0.060) (0.056) (0.051) (0.059) (0.054) (0.065) (0.064) (0.097) (0.094) (0.197) 
10+/ Non-family home -1.758** -2.000 0.131 -1.096*** -0.330*** -0.257 -0.648*** -0.561*** -0.461** -0.458*** -0.084 -0.035 0.183* 0.094 -0.196 -0.199 
 (0.763) (1.590) (0.789) (0.350) (0.103) (0.236) (0.160) (0.164) (0.196) (0.171) (0.832) (0.189) (0.106) (0.282) (0.538) (0.574) 
HRP growing up home 
tenure; 0 = Fully owned 
                
Mortgage 0.119 0.103 0.143*** 0.103 0.093** 0.053 0.054* 0.008 0.052** 0.005 -0.014 -0.065* -0.043 -0.076 -0.014 -0.060 
 (0.157) (0.292) (0.044) (0.064) (0.037) (0.043) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.035) (0.042) (0.052) (0.075) (0.105) 
Renting -0.328** -0.442 -0.195*** -0.260*** -0.167*** -0.246*** -0.161*** -0.234*** -0.169*** -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.226*** -0.229*** -0.289*** -0.237*** -0.220* 
 (0.147) (0.319) (0.051) (0.070) (0.043) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.024) (0.038) (0.041) (0.057) (0.084) (0.115) 
Free 
housing/foster/inst/other 
-0.396 -0.293 -0.190** -0.191 -0.071 -0.244** -0.063 -0.237*** -0.138** -0.227*** -0.154* -0.185** -0.127** -0.264** -0.367** -0.355 
 (0.285) (0.695) (0.079) (0.153) (0.089) (0.103) (0.079) (0.071) (0.061) (0.075) (0.086) (0.083) (0.059) (0.123) (0.144) (0.251) 
Present household type; 
0 = Single under SPA 
                
Couple under SPA, no 
kids 
0.859*** 0.942 0.914*** 0.851*** 0.567*** 0.551*** 0.540*** 0.509*** 0.549*** 0.472*** 0.449*** 0.366*** 0.317*** 0.349*** 0.453** 0.287 
 (0.307) (0.685) (0.117) (0.151) (0.098) (0.102) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.074) (0.064) (0.082) (0.078) (0.121) (0.192) (0.248) 
Couple, 1 under SPA, 
no kids 
1.935*** 1.424* 1.053*** 0.962*** 0.616*** 0.574*** 0.565*** 0.493*** 0.573*** 0.456*** 0.297*** 0.154 0.110 0.087 0.400* 0.111 
 (0.342) (0.847) (0.122) (0.187) (0.100) (0.126) (0.087) (0.087) (0.077) (0.091) (0.066) (0.101) (0.080) (0.150) (0.209) (0.306) 
Couple under SPA, dep 
kids 
0.762*** 0.944 0.965*** 0.888*** 0.574*** 0.567*** 0.551*** 0.507*** 0.574*** 0.485*** 0.424*** 0.375*** 0.242*** 0.272** 0.330* 0.039 
 (0.257) (0.715) (0.125) (0.158) (0.103) (0.106) (0.080) (0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.069) (0.085) (0.086) (0.127) (0.195) (0.258) 
Couple under SPA, non-
dep kids 
1.160*** 1.207 0.911*** 0.850*** 0.570*** 0.523*** 0.575*** 0.483*** 0.510*** 0.383*** 0.329*** 0.204* 0.014 0.028 -0.057 -0.245 
 (0.294) (0.927) (0.145) (0.204) (0.116) (0.137) (0.100) (0.095) (0.093) (0.100) (0.086) (0.110) (0.103) (0.164) (0.244) (0.335) 
Lone parent, dep kids -0.042 0.477 -0.014 -0.112 -0.388*** -0.413*** -0.367*** -0.331*** -0.261*** -0.275*** -0.250*** -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.248*** -0.296** -0.379** 
 (0.248) (0.516) (0.103) (0.114) (0.087) (0.077) (0.078) (0.053) (0.058) (0.056) (0.050) (0.061) (0.060) (0.091) (0.139) (0.187) 
Lone parent, non-dep 
kids 
-0.291 -0.397 -0.415* -0.415** -0.257 -0.184 -0.153* -0.240*** -0.157 -0.196** -0.141* -0.216** -0.296*** -0.195 -0.256 -0.539* 
 (0.463) (0.892) (0.236) (0.197) (0.170) (0.132) (0.091) (0.092) (0.097) (0.096) (0.085) (0.106) (0.097) (0.158) (0.362) (0.322) 
2+ Families/other 
hsehold 
0.197 0.481 0.368** 0.427** 0.391*** 0.400*** 0.415*** 0.332*** 0.450*** 0.322*** 0.402*** 0.217** 0.139 0.132 0.337 0.077 
 (0.348) (0.873) (0.151) (0.192) (0.131) (0.129) (0.092) (0.090) (0.098) (0.094) (0.085) (0.104) (0.112) (0.155) (0.249) (0.315) 
Non HRP Human 
capital (edu yrs) 
-0.020 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.010* 0.017*** 0.018* 0.019 0.040** 
 (0.015) (0.051) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.018) 
Non HRP Human 
capital squared 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of jobs in the 
household; 0=1 job  
                
2 jobs 0.878*** 0.566* 0.309*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.137*** 0.118*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.004 0.036 -0.006 0.011 -0.017 -0.061 -0.125 
 (0.180) (0.299) (0.057) (0.066) (0.038) (0.044) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.036) (0.039) (0.053) (0.076) (0.108) 
3+ jobs  1.358*** 0.622 0.232*** 0.109 0.076 -0.020 0.007 -0.017 0.015 -0.051 -0.138*** -0.161** -0.167*** -0.106 -0.196 -0.198 
 (0.257) (0.583) (0.087) (0.128) (0.065) (0.086) (0.054) (0.060) (0.048) (0.063) (0.038) (0.069) (0.054) (0.103) (0.139) (0.210) 
Non-HRP long-term                 
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illness; 0 = none 
Non-HRP previously 
long-ill 
0.170 -0.544 0.008 0.056 0.059 -0.005 -0.056 -0.032 -0.167* 0.108 0.277 0.357*** 0.315*** 0.323* 0.186 0.336 
 (0.588) (0.992) (0.202) (0.219) (0.054) (0.147) (0.139) (0.102) (0.099) (0.107) (0.362) (0.118) (0.072) (0.176) (0.214) (0.358) 
Non-HRP presently 
long-ill 
-0.428*** -0.285 -0.180*** -0.193*** -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.107*** -0.073** -0.064** -0.065* -0.077*** -0.034 -0.056** -0.099* -0.125 -0.132 
 (0.161) (0.316) (0.048) (0.070) (0.036) (0.047) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.021) (0.038) (0.027) (0.056) (0.076) (0.114) 
Rural (0= Urban) 0.368** 0.302 0.244*** 0.239*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.177*** 0.138*** 0.131*** -0.020 0.019 
 (0.157) (0.279) (0.040) (0.061) (0.031) (0.041) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.021) (0.033) (0.031) (0.049) (0.069) (0.101) 
Region                 
Wales 0.107 0.145 0.028 0.122 0.033 0.068 0.001 0.032 0.008 0.039 0.084 0.048 0.102 0.124 0.612*** 0.289 
 (0.260) (0.591) (0.099) (0.130) (0.085) (0.088) (0.076) (0.061) (0.054) (0.064) (0.072) (0.070) (0.069) (0.105) (0.181) (0.214) 
South West -0.465* -0.089 0.012 0.050 0.076 0.038 0.020 0.052 -0.038 0.043 0.052 0.064 0.090 0.075 0.274* 0.054 
 (0.266) (0.508) (0.097) (0.112) (0.061) (0.075) (0.063) (0.052) (0.043) (0.055) (0.039) (0.060) (0.063) (0.090) (0.145) (0.183) 
South East 0.014 0.185 0.212*** 0.263*** 0.135*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.206*** 0.226*** 0.186*** 0.252*** 0.231*** 0.323*** 0.289* 
 (0.242) (0.445) (0.066) (0.098) (0.045) (0.066) (0.059) (0.046) (0.037) (0.048) (0.035) (0.053) (0.064) (0.079) (0.096) (0.161) 
London -0.119 -0.023 0.163** 0.161 0.174*** 0.156** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.233*** 0.279*** 0.332*** 0.302*** 0.273*** 0.302*** 0.365*** 0.401** 
 (0.278) (0.511) (0.078) (0.113) (0.059) (0.076) (0.059) (0.053) (0.048) (0.055) (0.042) (0.061) (0.057) (0.091) (0.110) (0.185) 
East of England -0.617*** -0.312 0.120 0.160 0.166*** 0.090 0.112** 0.037 0.074* 0.091* 0.126*** 0.055 0.107** 0.123 0.497*** 0.304* 
 (0.219) (0.480) (0.084) (0.106) (0.064) (0.071) (0.056) (0.049) (0.041) (0.052) (0.032) (0.057) (0.053) (0.085) (0.122) (0.174) 
West Midlands -0.348 0.061 0.182** 0.179 0.057 0.021 -0.005 0.014 0.011 0.066 0.044 0.029 0.134 0.084 0.385*** 0.313* 
 (0.245) (0.497) (0.074) (0.110) (0.049) (0.074) (0.063) (0.051) (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.059) (0.082) (0.088) (0.140) (0.180) 
East Midlands -0.661** -0.482 0.024 0.036 -0.010 -0.022 0.060 0.028 -0.012 -0.006 0.024 -0.016 0.028 -0.019 0.389*** 0.300 
 (0.279) (0.506) (0.072) (0.112) (0.084) (0.075) (0.059) (0.052) (0.040) (0.054) (0.033) (0.060) (0.048) (0.090) (0.126) (0.183) 
Yorks and Humber 0.195 0.355 0.122 0.136 0.108** 0.029 0.047 -0.026 0.023 0.025 0.111*** 0.039 0.043 0.042 0.166* 0.189 
 (0.257) (0.483) (0.078) (0.107) (0.046) (0.072) (0.061) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.034) (0.058) (0.050) (0.086) (0.098) (0.175) 
North West -0.687*** -0.693 -0.078 -0.041 -0.079 -0.096 -0.027 -0.070 0.014 0.009 0.072** -0.012 0.024 -0.027 0.069 -0.002 
 (0.254) (0.466) (0.060) (0.103) (0.056) (0.069) (0.060) (0.048) (0.046) (0.050) (0.031) (0.055) (0.049) (0.082) (0.120) (0.168) 
North East 0.126 0.041 -0.175** -0.177 -0.097 -0.056 -0.053 -0.017 0.011 0.039 0.095* 0.029 0.039 0.025 0.263* 0.246 
 (0.280) (0.608) (0.073) (0.134) (0.100) (0.090) (0.069) (0.063) (0.051) (0.065) (0.050) (0.072) (0.055) (0.108) (0.140) (0.220) 
Year; 0 = 2008                 
Year 2009 -0.067 0.023 -0.148*** -0.105* -0.075** -0.080** -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.040 -0.060** -0.101*** -0.047 -0.054** -0.018 -0.047 0.120 
 (0.122) (0.261) (0.038) (0.058) (0.031) (0.039) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.046) (0.055) (0.094) 
Year 2010 -0.076 -0.049 -0.131*** -0.059 -0.084** -0.101** -0.090*** -0.109*** -0.046 -0.053 -0.056** -0.023 -0.023 0.056 0.115 0.333*** 
 (0.170) (0.303) (0.050) (0.067) (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036) (0.038) (0.054) (0.076) (0.109) 
Constant -9.786*** -8.620*** -5.229*** -5.543*** -3.648*** -3.922*** -2.887*** -2.776*** -2.526*** -2.239*** -1.590*** -1.130*** -0.706** -0.640 0.913 0.457 
 (1.440) (2.870) (0.407) (0.633) (0.347) (0.426) (0.312) (0.295) (0.233) (0.308) (0.205) (0.342) (0.349) (0.508) (0.960) (1.037) 
                 
Observations 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 9,064 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
